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ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE;


BY

FRANCIS WAYLAND, D.D.,

LATE PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

*ABRIDGED, AND ADAPTED TO THE USE OF
SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES,*

BY THE AUTHOR.



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P R E F A C E .



IN the following work I have attempted to present the more important truths of Moral Science, in such a form as may be useful in SCHOOLS and ACADEMIES. With this view, it has been not merely *abridged*, but also *re-written*; the argument in general omitted, and merely the result stated; and the illustrations adapted to the comprehension of the young. The style, so far as possible, has been rendered simple; and the words and phrases selected with special reference to the ordinary language of persons not accustomed to moral speculations. Such at least has been the attempt. How far it has succeeded, can be learned only from experiment.

To each section and chapter a number of Questions have been added. These are not

designed as aids for learning the text, but as exercises for practice after the text has been learned. They therefore sometimes involve inferences from the truths stated in the text, and at other times the practical application of the doctrines taught to the purposes and business of ordinary life.

As this work is designed for schools, it may not be amiss to suggest the method in which the author supposes it may be most successfully taught. He would advise that, in general, the text be given as a lesson by itself. After this has been learned, the succeeding lesson may be the questions which follow, with a review of the section to which they refer. In this manner I think the pupil will be the most likely to exercise his own mind upon the subject, and will thus understand it better, and retain it more perfectly. It is of course understood, that these questions are but a specimen of those which might easily be raised from the subjects presented. A thoughtful instructor will derive

great pleasure from adding to them from his own reflections. It will also be a useful exercise for each pupil to furnish questions to be answered by the other members of the class. If the instructor feel disposed to examine more fully for himself the reasonings by which the doctrines in this work are supported, he will find them stated considerably at large in the full work from which the present is abridged.

It deserves also to be remarked that the end of the study of Moral Science is to make men better. If in this respect it fail, it is at best useless. This should be continually borne in mind by the instructor. Hence his constant object should be so to conduct the recitations on this subject as to leave a moral impression on the mind of the student, to awaken in him a conviction of his own responsibility, and of his obligation to obey God, to create in him a love of virtue and a hatred of vice, and to teach him the blessings derived from self-government, purity of character, and undissembled

piety. The instructor can derive no higher reward than to witness such moral improvement in the character of those committed to his charge.

With a sincere desire that the present little work may be found useful in enabling instructors thus to accomplish the highest purposes of their profession, it is committed to their hands by the author.

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ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

OF MORAL LAW, MORAL ACTION, AND OF
INTENTION.

SECTION I.

OF MORAL LAW.

MORAL SCIENCE is the science of *moral law*. Whenever men observe that two events are so connected together, that, as often as one precedes, the other always follows it, they apply to such a connection the name of *law*. They also call the first event the *cause*, and the second the *effect*. For instance :

It has been observed, that when water is cooled down to a certain point, it becomes solid, or is changed into ice; and hence, chemists have laid it down as a *law* that water freezes at this particular point. Again, they have observed, that, if its temperature be raised to a certain point, it turns into vapor, or boils; hence they have laid it down as another *law* that, at this particular point, water boils; that is, they mean to inform us

of the universal fact, that, whenever, under given circumstances, the one event occurs, the other event also invariably occurs. And they say that cold is the *cause* of the freezing of water, and heat the *cause* of its boiling.

But, it is evident, that two events could not be thus invariably connected, unless there were some power exerted to connect them, and some being, who, at all times, and in all places, exerted this power. Hence the fact, that the laws of nature exist, teaches us the existence of the Supreme Being, the Creator and Preserver of all things. And hence, every change which we see, is a proof of the existence of God.

And it is also evident, that the Creator has connected events together in this manner, in order to *direct our conduct*. Thus, having connected a certain degree of heat with the boiling of water, he intends to teach us, that, if we wish to make water boil, we must raise it to that degree of heat. And thus, in general, since he adheres unchangeably to the laws which he has established, we can never either accomplish any purpose, or produce any effect, by attempting to do it, in any other way, than in that which He has appointed.

Let us now apply this to *morals*. Every one knows that he perceives certain actions to

be either right or wrong. Every one feels, that it is wrong to lie, to steal, to murder, to be cruel. Every one feels that it is right to tell the truth, to be honest, affectionate, kind and grateful. And, if even a young person will think for a moment, he will perceive, that there are certain results, which always follow these two sorts of actions. If any one do wrong, as, for instance, if he lie, or steal, or abuse another person, he feels a peculiar sort of unhappiness, which is called the feeling of guilt; he is afraid of being detected, he wishes he had not done it, and if he be detected he knows that every one dislikes and despises him for his conduct: And, on the contrary, if he have done right, as, if he have told the truth, have been grateful, or have returned good for evil, he feels a peculiar sort of pleasure, he is satisfied with himself, and knows that all men will look upon him with respect.

Now, as these events, and a multitude of others, are thus found connected together, we designate such a connection of the term *law*. And, as the foundation of this connection is what is called the moral nature of an action, we call the law a moral law.

As we find these events, namely, pleasure following right actions, and pain following bad actions, to be invariable, we know that they

must have been connected together by God our Creator and our Judge. And, as he has manifestly connected them together for the purpose of teaching us, we may hence learn, how he wishes us to act. Thus, if God have always connected pleasure with honesty, and pain with dishonesty, it is as plainly his will that we should be honest, as though he had said so by a voice from heaven. If every murderer in a country be punished with death, it is just as clearly a direction for our conduct, without any written prohibition of murder, as with it.

By thus observing the consequences of actions, we may learn what, in many respects, is the law, or will of our Creator. Besides this, however, we have a revelation of his will made in the Holy Scriptures, in which he both informs us how we should act, and also makes known to us still further the consequences which he has connected both with obedience and disobedience.

These laws, classified and illustrated, form the Science of Moral Philosophy.

QUESTIONS.

1. Give an example of some natural law, that is, of some event which you always see following some other event.
2. Give an example of some moral law.
3. How do you prove the existence of God?

4. Give an example of some law by which God intends to direct our conduct.

5. Can you remember any instance in your life, in which you have felt the pleasure attending good actions and the pain attending bad actions?

6. Why did God connect pain with one kind of actions, and pleasure with another kind of actions?

7. If you were to attend to these pleasures and pains, would you not know your duty much better than you do, and be much happier than you are?

8. Why then do you not attend to them, and act accordingly?

9. Do you think you understand what is meant by moral science? Explain it in your own language.

SECTION II.

OF MORAL ACTION AND OF INTENTION.

It may here be asked, what is a moral action? When any one does anything *on purpose*, we call this an action.

But, both brutes and men do things on purpose. Animals frequently injure each other, and injure men, with the intention of doing so.

If, however, we compare the actions of brutes with those of men, we shall find that we observe a difference between them. We feel that the *brute* does not *know better*, or does not and cannot know that it is *wrong*; while we feel that the *man* does, or can know that it is *wrong*. Now, as the brute cannot distinguish between right and wrong, we do not consider his action

a *moral action*; but as the man can make this distinction, we call his action a *moral action*.

Again, every one knows that we sometimes do things by accident, as, we may injure a person by throwing a ball, without seeing that he is in the way. In this case, we do not feel guilt, although we always should feel regret. Our conscience does not accuse us, unless we either intended to do harm, or were culpably negligent.

Again, we sometimes intend to do some one a kindness, and it turns out, in the end, that what we have done is an injury to him. Thus, suppose I send food to a sick man, and the food gives him pain; I regret his pain, but I cannot disapprove of my act, for I *intended* to do him a kindness. From these, and such like instances, any one may see, that we always judge of the moral quality of actions by the intention.

Our intentions may be wrong in several ways:

1. Where we intend to injure another; as when we strike a person in anger, or speak against another, for the sake of making others think badly of him.

2. Where we intend to gratify ourselves, without any regard to the misery we cause to others. Such is the case, when one person

makes sport of another, for the sake of fun, without having any malice towards him. We have no right to gratify ourselves, at the expense of the happiness of any one else.

And, in general, we may lay it down as a universal rule, that our intention is wrong, whenever we intend to do anything contrary to any law of God. This law is summed up in the two precepts, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and, as ye would that others should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.

3. As the moral character of an action is determined by the intention; if we intend to do wrong, although we may not actually do it, this intention is wicked. And when we really intend to do good, though we may not be able to carry our intention into effect, this intention is acceptable to God. Thus, God was pleased with David because he *intended* to build the temple, though he was not permitted to do it. Thus, also, the good wishes and benevolent desires of the poor may be as much charity in the sight of God, as the alms of the rich.

4. As a good intention is necessary to a virtuous action, if an action, which God has commanded, be performed without a good intention, the act is not virtuous in the sight of God. It is right to do justice to a poor widow. But the unjust judge, who neither feared God nor

regarded man, and who avenged the poor widow because she troubled him, did not perform a virtuous action. His only intention was, to get rid of trouble. Thus, a child may do what its parents command, but do it in a bad temper. Though he may perform the action, yet he is not an obedient child, unless he perform it from good will, and with love to his parents.

And, finally, every person must have observed that our intentions are very much influenced by our previous feelings. Any one who indulges himself in envious or revengeful or malicious feelings, is much more likely to do envious or revengeful or malicious actions, than one who never indulges in such thoughts. Hence we see, that such feelings, as they lead us to do wrong actions, must, in themselves, be wrong. This is what our blessed Saviour means, when he tells us, that out of the *heart* proceeds all manner of evil.

QUESTIONS.

1. Do brutes and men both act?
2. What is the great difference between brutes and men?
3. Can we influence men, in any way different from that in which we influence brutes?
4. Can you illustrate this by an example?
5. What is the best way of influencing men?

6. If men will not be influenced by knowing that an action is right or wrong, what are they like?

7. Do young persons ever act thus?

8. Is it honorable or disgraceful to act thus?

9. If a person injure us by accident, ought we to feel as if he had done wrong? If not, why? Give an example.

10. If a person intending to do us a kindness injure us, ought we to feel grateful or displeased? And why? Give an example.

11. Give an example of an action with a bad intention.

12. Give an example of a wrong action done thoughtlessly.

13. Do you ever do such actions?

14. Give an example of something wrong, when no action is really done.

15. Give an example of a right action, without any good intention.

16. Show how people make themselves wicked, by indulging in wicked thoughts.



CHAPTER II.

OF CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

WHAT WE MEAN BY CONSCIENCE; AND HOW CONSCIENCE ADMONISHES US.

WHENEVER we do any thing, there must always be something *with which* we do it. Thus, if we walk, we must have legs to walk with. If we see, we must have eyes to see with. If we hear, we must have ears to hear with; and so of a thousand cases.

This is equally true of our internal or mental actions. Thus, if we either think, or feel, we must have a mind to think or to feel with. If we remember, we must have a memory to remember with.

Now, every one knows that he has the power of observing the difference between right and wrong in the actions of men ; and that he also is subject to peculiar feelings, in consequence of the existence of such qualities in his own actions. We give the name conscience to that faculty which man has, but which brutes have not, by which we make this distinction, and suffer or enjoy these feelings.

If now we will observe, we shall see that this feeling of right and of wrong belongs to our actions, whether they respect either God or man. If a boy tell a lie, though no one know it, or swear, though no one hear him, or break the holy Sabbath, though no one can see him, he feels guilty of a sin against God, and he justly fears that God will punish him. If he steal his neighbor's property, or cheat his playmates, or strike or abuse them, he feels guilty of injuring them, is ashamed to look them in the face, and is conscious that he deserves to be punished for his conduct.*

* It may be added, that we are conscious of some of these feelings when we abuse brute animals

And hence we say, that conscience is that faculty of the mind, by which we distinguish between right and wrong in our actions, whether they have respect to our fellow men, or to God. And, as we form the same judgment respecting the actions of other men, as we do respecting our own, we say, that conscience is the faculty by which we distinguish between right and wrong in moral action. It is by the same faculty that we feel a sort of impulsion to do what we know to be right, and a sort of monition not to do what we know to be wrong; and also, that we in the one case feel pleasure, and in the other case feel pain.

Let us now reflect for a moment upon our feelings respecting right and wrong, that we may observe in what manner conscience admonishes us.

1. Suppose we are considering an action, in order to decide whether or not we shall do it. Let us take a case. Suppose a child were so wicked as to be angry with his father, and was considering whether he should strike him. He would probably think, first of all, that his father was stronger than he, and would punish him for it. This would show that it was *unwise*, for he would lose more than he would gain. But suppose his father was sick in bed, and so weak that he could not punish his child

for doing wrong. If the child reflected for a moment, he would feel that it was *wrong* to strike his parent, and that it made no difference whether his father could punish him or not. And if a child saw another child strike a sick father, instead of doing him all the good he could, he would say that the child had done a very wicked thing, and that he *ought to be* punished for it. And if the child, in attempting to strike his father, hurt himself badly, though every one would be sorry for him, yet they would all say that it served him right, and that he deserved it.

Again, suppose a child to feel that it was wrong to strike his father; he would also feel something which seemed to tell him not to do it. If he were *angry*, there would be two kinds of feelings within him. His angry feelings would urge him to do it, and his conscience would say, you ought not to do it. And he would be a bad or a good boy, just as he obeyed his angry passions, or as he obeyed his conscience. Or, to take another case. Suppose a boy had received some money which was given to him for the purpose of buying play-things for himself. As he was going to the toy-shop, he met a poor woman, whose children were starving for want of something to eat. His love of play would urge him to

buy the play-things. But his conscience would urge him to relieve the poor starving children. A selfish boy would yield to his love of toys, and leave the children to starve. A good boy would yield to his conscience, and deny himself, and give the money to the poor.

We may also learn how conscience admonishes us, by observing how we feel after an action has been performed. Thus, take the last case. If a boy had been benevolent, he would feel happy, he would approve of what he had done. And, if he had seen such an action done by another, he would love him for it, and desire to see him rewarded. Thus, if the benevolent boy, afterwards, in passing along the street, had found twice as much money as he gave away to the poor children, every one would be glad of it, and say that he deserved to be rewarded.

On the contrary, if a boy, instead of being kind to these children, had left them to perish, or more especially, if he had called them names, or had struck them; when he went away and thought upon his conduct, he would feel ashamed, sorry, and very unhappy, and be afraid that some misfortune would befall him. And if we should see any one act so wickedly, we should feel a dislike to him, we should not wish to associate with him, and we should say that he deserved to be punished.

This is one great reason why persons who have done wrong are so fearful and cowardly ; and why those who have done well are so much bolder. He who has done wrong knows that he deserves to be punished ; and hence he is afraid that every body is going to punish him. He who has done well knows that he deserves to be rewarded, and hence he is afraid of no one.

And this is one reason why those who have done wrong are so commonly found out. He who has done wrong is afraid and ashamed ; he shows it in his countenance and in his actions ; and the more he tries to conceal it, the more clearly he discovers it. Thus the Bible tells us that the wicked is snared in the work of his own hands ; and though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go unpunished.

QUESTIONS.

1. It is said that if we do anything, we must have something to do it with. Give examples of this.
2. How do you know that you have a conscience?
3. When you disobey your parents, how do you feel?
4. When you sin against God, how do you feel?
5. What is it that produces these feelings?
6. When you do well and obey God, how do you feel?
7. What is it produces these feelings?
8. Have brutes any such feelings? Why?
9. When you have been thinking whether or not you should do some particular wrong act, have you never felt something telling you you ought not? What was it that forbade you?

10. When you have been thinking about doing a good action, have you not felt something urging you to do it? What was it that urged you to do it?

11. Do you not feel displeased with persons who lie, and steal, and act cruelly? What makes you feel thus?

12. After a boy has done wickedly, does he feel as happy when he comes home, as when he has behaved well? Give an example.

13. Why is wicked conduct so easily found out?

14. Why are people so afraid when they have done wrong?

15. Why are good people so often happy, when they come to die?

16. Why are bad people so often miserable, when they come to die?

SECTION II.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE MAY IMPROVE OR INJURE OUR CONSCIENCE.

Every one must have observed, that all our faculties are capable of being improved or injured. Some persons of the same age are stronger than others. One man is strong in his arms, and another is strong in his legs. And so of our internal faculties. One man has a powerful, and another a weak memory. One has a facility in writing, and another writes with difficulty. And so of a vast variety of cases.

Now if we look at these instances again, we shall find this to be the general fact respecting them. Those faculties are the strongest which

are *used the most*. If one man be stronger than another, we shall find that he uses his strength more, or that he works more than the other. He whose occupations require the use of his arms, becomes strong in his arms; while he who walks or runs much, becomes strong in his legs. He who uses his memory habitually, remembers easily, that is, acquires a strong memory; while he who rarely tries to recollect what he hears or reads, very soon has a weak memory. And thus men have come to this general conclusion, that all our faculties are strengthened by use, and weakened by disuse.

This rule applies to conscience in several particulars.

1. The more frequently we use our conscience in judging between actions as right or wrong, the more easily shall we learn to judge correctly concerning them. He who, before every action, will deliberately ask himself, is this right or wrong, will seldom mistake what is his duty. And children may do this, as well as grown persons.

2. Our conscience is also improved in this respect, by reflecting upon virtuous actions, and thinking upon virtuous characters. The more we do this, the easier do we learn to distinguish and to avoid everything that is wrong. It is for this reason that we should reflect much

on the perfect character of our blessed Saviour, if we wish to improve our consciences, and make progress in virtue. So young persons should reflect upon the characters of Samuel, Joseph, Daniel, as they are recorded in the Bible, and of General Washington and other good men who have lived in later times. And of course, on the contrary, we shall weaken our power of making moral distinctions:—

1. If we neglect to inquire into the moral character of our actions. If children or men go on doing right or wrong, just as it happens, without ever inquiring about it, they will at last care but little whether they do the one or the other; and in many cases will hardly be able to distinguish between them. Every one knows that children who are taught by their parents to reflect upon their actions, and distinguish between right and wrong, know much better how they *ought to act*, than those whose parents never give them any instruction on the subject.

2. And again, we injure our power of judging correctly of moral actions, if we allow ourselves to witness, or to hear of, wickedness; or, if we are in the habit of letting wicked thoughts dwell in our minds. If a boy, for the first time, hear another swear, he will feel it to be wrong. But if he associate much with him,

he will soon care nothing about it, and very soon will begin to swear himself. The same is the case with lying, cruelty, bad language, and any other wickedness. This shows us, how careful we should be to avoid all bad company, and never to mingle with those who persist in doing wrong.

I have mentioned above, that we could all observe in the feeling of conscience, a sort of command, urging us to do what is right. Now this command becomes stronger or weaker, just in proportion as we use it. For instance, he who is careful always to do what his conscience commands, finds the power of temptation over him to be weaker. He who strives always to be just, and never to defraud any one of the least thing, either in play, or in earnest, will find a very strong opposition in his mind, to doing any injustice ; while he, who, only occasionally, allows himself to lie or cheat, will find that his opposition to lying and dishonesty is gradually growing weaker, and it is well, if he do not, in the end, become a confirmed thief and liar.

And it is moreover to be remarked, that both of these last rules have an effect upon each other. The more we are in the habit of reflecting upon the right and the wrong of our actions, the stronger will be our inclination to

do right; and the more scrupulously we do right, the more easily shall we be able to distinguish between right and wrong.

Once more. I have alluded to the fact that conscience is a source of pleasure and of pain. It is so, in a greater or less degree, in proportion as we use it.

The oftener we do good actions, the greater happiness we receive from doing them. Do you not observe how happy, kind and benevolent persons always are? Do you not observe, that persons, who very seldom do a good action, do it almost without pleasure; while really benevolent and kind people seem to derive constant happiness from making others happy? And, if there is so much happiness to be derived from doing good, we ought to be grateful that God has placed us in a world, in which there is so much good to be done, and in which every one, poor as well as rich, young as well as old, may enjoy this happiness, almost as much as he pleases.

And, on the contrary, the oftener men disobey their consciences, the less pain do they suffer from doing wrong. When boys first lie, or use bad words, they feel guilty, and very unhappy; but if they are so wicked as to form the habit of doing thus, they soon do it without any pain, and sometimes even become

proud of it. This is the case with stealing, or any other wickedness.

At first view, this might seem to be a benefit conferred on a wicked person, because he thus can do wrong, without so much suffering. But if we consider it a little more attentively, we shall see that it is exactly the reverse. For, when a person is afraid to do wrong, and suffers, in his conscience, in consequence of it, he will do it rarely and secretly; but when he ceases to be thus pained, he becomes bold, and does it openly, and soon meets with the punishment which he deserves. And besides, it is very merciful in God thus to admonish us by our conscience, when we do wrong. And when we cease to be thus admonished, it is a proof that he has become more and more angry with us, and is letting us go on to our destruction without any more warning. And besides, this stupidity of conscience will last but for a very short time. Conscience frequently awakens in sickness, or on a death-bed. It will assume an infinitely greater power in eternity than it ever does on earth. And then, if we have lived and died wickedly, it will be a source of torment to us forever.

From what we have said, one or two things are plain.

1. The more frequently we do right, the

easier will it be to do right; and the greater pleasure will the doing of right give us. The oftener we resist temptation, the easier can we resist, not only this temptation, but every other. And thus, at every step of our progress in virtue, we shall be prepared to be more and more virtuous; and our characters will become fixed on a surer foundation.

2. And, on the contrary, the oftener we do wrong, the more difficult it is to resist temptation, the more readily do we fall into sin, and with the less remorse do we violate all the monitions of conscience. Hence, the further we go on in sin, the more difficult it is to return to virtue, and the less is the hope of our recovery.

And hence we should learn how great is the importance of resisting *every* temptation, and of doing right *resolutely*, under all possible circumstances. And, moreover, we learn that if we have formed any bad habit, the *present* is the very best time to break off from it. We cannot delay for a moment without making the case worse; both by increasing the actual difficulty, and by diminishing our strength to surmount it. And if this be the case with our sins against man, by how much more does it hold in respect to our sins against God.

The following illustration is so peculiarly

appropriate, that I with great pleasure insert it. It is from the Juvenile Miscellany.

THE ALARM WATCH.

A lady, who found it difficult to awake so early as she wished in the morning, purchased an alarm watch. These watches are so contrived as to strike with a very loud, whirring noise, at any hour the owner pleases to set them.

The lady placed the watch at the head of the bed, and, at the appointed time, she found herself effectually roused by the long rattling sound. She immediately obeyed the summons, and felt the better all the day for her early rising. This continued for several weeks. The alarm watch faithfully performed its office, and was distinctly *heard*, so long as it was promptly *obeyed*. But, after a time, the lady grew tired of early rising; and, when she was awakened by the noisy monitor, she merely turned herself and slept again. In a few days the watch ceased to arouse her from slumber. It spoke just as loudly as ever, but she did not *hear* it, because she had acquired the habit of *disobeying* it. Finding that she might just as well be without an alarm watch, she formed the wise resolution, that, if she ever heard the sound again, she would jump up instantly, and that she would

never more allow herself to disobey the friendly warning.

Just so it is with conscience. If we obey its dictates, even to the most trifling particulars, we always hear its voice, clear and strong. But, if we allow ourselves to do what we fear may not be quite right, we shall grow more and more sleepy, until the voice of conscience has no longer any power to awaken us.

QUESTIONS.

1. It is said, that every faculty of body or of mind is improved by use. Give examples of this.

2. It is said, that every faculty of body or of mind is weakened by disuse. Give an example.

3. What is the difference between the result of industry and of idleness? Can you give an example in both body and mind?

4. If such be the law of God, what did he mean to teach us?

5. What two benefits shall we receive from reflecting on the right or the wrong of our actions?

6. What benefit shall we receive from associating with the good and virtuous?

7. What two injuries do we suffer from acting without moral reflection?

8. What are the consequences of associating with the wicked? Give an example.

9. Suppose a person disobey his conscience, what are the results? Give an example.

10. Why can good people, that is, those who act well, judge better than others of moral subjects? Whose advice, then, should we always follow?

11. If men wish to be happy, how should they act?
12. If a person do wrong without feeling the pains of conscience, is it a good or a bad sign?
13. What benefit do we receive from the *habit* of acting right?
14. What injury from the *habit* of acting wrong? Give examples of both.
15. When should a person break off from doing wrong; and begin to act right? Give an example.

SECTION III.

RULES FOR OUR MORAL CONDUCT.

Rules to be observed before you resolve to do any action.

1. Always ask yourself, first of all, is this action right? To enable you to answer this inquiry, God gave you a conscience, and the Holy Bible. If you do not use these means for ascertaining your duty, you are very wicked, and God will hold you guilty. And always ask this question *before* you begin; for after you have begun, or after you are very much set upon doing anything, it will probably be too late.

2. Remember what we have said about persons abusing their conscience by not obeying it. You have frequently done this, and of course your conscience is not as correct a guide as it ought to be. Hence, in many cases, you may only doubt. Now, when you doubt whether

any action is right, you ought never to do it, unless you also as much doubt whether you are at liberty to leave it undone.

3. Make it a settled rule, always to do what your conscience directs, and to leave undone what it forbids. No matter whether it be in action, or word, or thought, in public or in private, no matter how much you may suffer in consequence of it, always do what you believe to be right. There can no evil happen to you so great as to do wrong ; and you can gain no good so great as that which arises from doing right. No matter who is for you, or who against you ; always obey God in preference to everything else.

Rules after an action has been performed.

1. Be in the habit of reflecting upon your actions, and of deciding carefully whether they were right or wrong. This is called self-examination.

Do this *deliberately*. It should be done alone and in retirement. If you do not take time specially for it, you will never do it at all.

Do it *impartially*. Try to come to a correct conclusion. Put other persons in your place, and suppose them to act as you have acted, and then ask yourself what judgment you would form concerning them. Place before you the law of God, and the example of Jesus

Christ, and see how your actions correspond with theirs. It is very useful for young persons to converse on these subjects with their parents and older friends, and to ask their instruction and direction respecting actions of which they themselves are unable to form a decided opinion.

Suppose now you have examined yourself, and have come to a decision respecting your actions : —

1. If you have done right, be thankful to God, who has enabled you to do so, and let the peace which you enjoy lead you to resolve more firmly in favor of virtue.

2. If your actions have been mixed, that is, if some of your motives have been good, and some of them bad ; try to ascertain how you came to blend them together, and avoid in future the causes which led you into error.

3. If, upon reflection, you find that your actions have been wrong : —

1. Reflect upon the action till you are sensible of its guilt.

2. Be willing to suffer the pains of conscience. Do not try to forget the subject by doing something else, but be willing to be pained, that you may the more readily avoid doing wrong in future.

3. Do not forget the subject, until you have

come to a resolution, founded on the moral wrong of the action, never to do so any more.

4. If you can repair the injury you have done, repair it immediately. If you have told a lie, go immediately and confess it. If you have taken what did not belong to you, go and restore it. And if restitution be out of your power, go at least and acknowledge your fault.

5. As every wrong action is a sin against God, seek in humble repentance his pardon, through the mediation of his Son Jesus Christ.

6. Observe the courses of thinking or of acting which were the causes of your offending, and be specially careful to guard against them in future.

7. Do all this, in humble dependence upon that merciful and everywhere present Being, who is always ready to grant us all the assistance necessary to the keeping of his commandments, and who will never leave us nor forsake us, if we humbly put our trust in him.

From what has been said, we must be convinced of the solemn responsibility which rests upon every human being, whether young or old. He is in the possession of a faculty, which admonishes him of his duty to God and to man. It is an everywhere present faculty; we always hear its monitions when we wish to hear them, and it frequently speaks, when we

desire it to be silent. Hence it is, that if we do wrong, we are justly held by our Creator to be inexcusable. And all this is still more strongly enforced by the fact, that this conscience, endowed with a tenfold energy, will ever abide with us, and will be a source of pleasure or pain to us throughout eternity. And, as young persons have a conscience, as well as those that are older, they are just as truly bound to obey it; and God will as surely punish them if they disobey it.

QUESTIONS.

1. What is the first question to be asked before we begin to do anything? Give an example. Do you act thus?
2. When we doubt whether an action is right, what ought we to do? Give an example.
3. Suppose we believe any action to be wrong, what ought to induce us to do it?
4. Suppose we believe anything to be our duty, what ought to prevent us from doing it? Give an example.
5. Do you ever examine yourself, to know whether your actions are right or wrong?
6. Do you really try to know how to act so as to please God?
7. When young persons do not know their duty, how should they try to learn it? Give an example.
8. Suppose you had given a poor person money, partly from compassion and partly from vanity, what should you try to do next time?

9. Suppose a person has told a falsehood, what should he do, if he mean to do right?

10. What excuse can we make, if we do wrong, since we have a conscience to admonish us? Why?

11. Can a man ever get rid of his conscience after death?

12. Will our conscience give us pleasure or pain in eternity?

13. How must we live, if we wish our conscience to give us pleasure after we die?



CHAPTER III.

IS A MAN SURE THAT HE DOES RIGHT WHEN HIS
CONSCIENCE DOES NOT REPROVE HIM?

WE frequently observe that some men are not reprov'd by their consciences for doing things, for which others feel very guilty. Thus, some persons swear, and say it is no harm, while others would feel very guilty if they did so. Now, how is this to be accounted for; and how does this affect their real guilt in the sight of God?

This is to be accounted for on the principles which we have before stated. We have said that conscience is injured by disobeying its dictates. If a boy swear, and his conscience reprove him, and he do not obey it, it will reprove him less next time, and less still the next time, until it at last ceases to reprove him al-

together. But this does not make the thing any the less wrong than it was at first. Suppose a man look at the sun, and it injures his eyes; he looks again, and it injures them more; and at last he becomes entirely blind, so that he cannot see it at all. This would not prove that the sun did not shine.

And hence we see, that since we are all sinners, we may do many things, which we do not perceive to be wrong, that really are very wrong in the sight of God. A wicked child may not feel it to be wrong to disobey its parents, but this does not render it the less wicked. We generally do not feel guilty for disobeying God, and forgetting all his goodness, but this does not render it the less sinful.

And thus, since this very stupidity of conscience is a man's own fault, he is not the less to blame on account of it. He will be as justly punished for the last sin, for which his conscience did not reprove him, as for the first, for which it reproved him ever so severely.

And here it may be proper to say a few words respecting habit.

When a man does a thing very often, he does it very easily, and does it without thinking, and, at last, it seems as though he could not help doing it. You see how soon people

acquire the habit of playing on musical instruments, of using certain words, etc.

This is the case with moral action. A man by doing good actions, acquires the habit of doing them, so that he does them of course; and a man in the same manner acquires the habit of doing bad actions, so that he does them without reflection.

Now, the question is this. Does an action become less wrong, because we have acquired the habit of doing it?

I think not. Because, if God have forbidden it, our having acquired the habit of doing it does not alter his command. God has said, thou shalt not steal, and he will not alter his command. If it be displeasing to him for us to steal, how much more must he be displeased with us for acquiring the habit of stealing. If a person struck you, and his conscience reproved him, you would say that he ought to be sorry for it, and never to do it again. You would certainly think it no excuse for him to strike you every time he saw you, until his conscience did not reprove him at all. You would say, it was wrong to strike me once, how much more to acquire the habit of striking me every time you saw me.

If this be so, how wicked must it be for people to form those bad habits, which many

fall into; and to do wicked actions, without any thought or reflection.

QUESTIONS.

1. If you compare your actions with the law of God, would you not find that you do many things which he has forbidden, but which you do not feel to be wrong? Give some examples.

2. Will God call you to account for these actions, or not?

3. Will such actions be more excusable than any others?

4. Suppose a boy should lie, so that he did not care whether he told the truth or not, would this be any excuse for him? Why?

5. Suppose a boy swore once, and his conscience reproved him, and another swore so much that he did not know when he did it, which would be the most guilty? Why?

6. Are persons generally better or worse than they suppose themselves to be? Why?

7. What does this section teach us respecting the importance of forming habits?



CHAPTER IV.

OF HAPPINESS.

OUR Creator has formed us with various desires for the different objects around us. The gratification of these desires is called happiness or pleasure. Thus, we are fond of par-

ticular kinds of food and drink, of music, of colors and scenery ; these are called pleasures of sense. We are pleased with reading and knowledge, with poetry and eloquence ; these are called pleasures of intellect. We are made happy by the society of our friends and relations ; these are called social pleasures. And lastly, we derive happiness from doing right and from being virtuous ; this is called moral pleasure.

Now, inasmuch as our Creator has formed us capable of being made happy from all these sources, and has placed all these objects around us, it is evident that he meant us to enjoy them all, that is, to be made happy by them. Thus, he meant us to derive one sort of happiness from things that we see and hear and taste ; another, from things that we read or think about ; another, from our friends and relations ; and another from doing right, and in all things obeying him.

But it is always to be remarked, that while all these are sources of happiness, and are designed to be such by our Creator, they are manifestly designed to be such only within certain limits. Thus, though the love of food is designed to be a source of happiness, it is found that, if food be partaken of beyond a certain quantity, it produces disgust, sickness

or death. And not only so, but if taken in improper quantities, it also destroys our capacity for intellectual and moral pleasure. If intellectual pleasures be pursued beyond a certain limit, the power of intellectual gratification is weakened, and if pursued to the utmost, the result is derangement. And even moral pleasures, as, for instance, devotion, may, in our present state, be pursued so far as to injure the health, and produce despondency and distrust, instead of cheerful, active, and useful piety.

Hence, while it is true that the gratification of our desires is human happiness, and that the Creator designed them to be gratified, it is also true, that human happiness consists in the gratification of these desires within such limits as he has prescribed. So soon as we transgress these limits, the result is not happiness, but misery. And hence the greatest happiness of which we are susceptible is to be found in subjecting ourselves to the moral, social, intellectual and physical laws which he has ordained, that is, in obeying in all things the holy, wise, just and merciful will of Him who made us. As soon as we begin to pursue any gratification in a manner, or to an extent, at variance with the laws of our Creator, we always make ourselves miserable. The most

unhappy class of persons on earth are those who live for nothing else but amusement, and without any regard to the Creator's laws. Hence, if persons wish to be happy, they ought to observe several rules.

1. They ought to be temperate, that is, to use no food nor drink that does not do them good; and to partake of proper food and drink, only in such quantity as will be useful to them. When people eat so that it gives them pain or makes them sleepy, they may know that they have been intemperate.

2. They ought to be industrious. Without labor we soon become weak and sickly; and, also, without labor, we can never enjoy much pleasure either from reading or knowledge. Indolence weakens the mind as much as it does the body.

3. They ought to be studious. I do not mean that every one should employ all his time in study. This would be impossible. All I mean, is, that every one should regularly give some time, as much as his occupations will allow, to reading and the cultivation of his mind. This will soon become a great source of pleasure, and a great means of usefulness. It was by employing his leisure hours in this manner, that Franklin laid the foundation of his greatness, and raised him-

self from the rank of a poor printer's boy to that of an eminent philosopher and statesman.

4. They should be good. That is, they should in everything strive to serve and obey God. This will give us the pleasure of gratitude, in addition to that derived from the reception of our daily mercies; it will give us comfort in trouble, all the pleasure of delightful intercourse with our best Friend, our Father in heaven, and the hope of being forever happy when we die. Every one must allow, that really religious people, whether young or old, are much happier than any other persons.

5. We should be benevolent; that is, we should seek to make others happy. This is one way of serving God. There is more pleasure in seeing others happy than in seeking to be happy ourselves. There is more pleasure in acquiring knowledge for the purpose of being useful, than acquiring it merely for the sake of our gratification. If young and old persons would spend half the money in making others happy, which they spend in dress and useless luxury, how much more real pleasure it would give them.

QUESTIONS.

1. Give examples of the various kinds of human happiness.
2. How do you know that God meant you to eat apples, or to look at a rainbow, or to act virtuously?
3. How do you know that God did not intend you to eat the leaves of the apple tree, instead of the fruit?
4. How do you know that God did not mean you to eat more than two or three apples, at one time?
5. How do you know that he meant you to study, but not to study all night?
6. How may we know, by the effects upon ourselves, that we have transgressed any law of our Creator?
7. How ought a person to spend a day if he wished to spend it happily? Go through the day and illustrate it.
8. When you act thus, do you not find yourself most happy?
9. Which are the more desirable, the pleasures of sense or those of intellect?
10. Which are more desirable, the pleasures of sense, or social pleasures?
11. Which are more desirable, the pleasures of sense, or moral pleasures? Illustrate all these.
12. What sort of pleasures do brutes enjoy?
13. Suppose a man derives all his pleasures from his appetites, that is, from eating and drinking, etc., what is he like?

CHAPTER V.

THE IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE.

It has already been stated that conscience, like all our other powers, is strengthened by use, and injured by abuse. We abuse our conscience whenever we do wrong. And, as it is universally allowed that all men do wrong, it is evident that the consciences of all men must be imperfect.

But, although we have thus rendered our consciences imperfect, the law of God remains the same; that is, he commands the same duties, offers the same rewards, and threatens the same punishments. He does not alter his laws, because men will not obey them. If a parent should forbid a child to do something, and the child should stop his ears so that he did not hear, he ought to be punished for doing wrong just as much as if he had heard, because it was his own fault that he did not hear.

And if men have become so sinful that they do not hear the voice of God when he speaks to them by conscience, and if they are going on thus thoughtlessly, sinning against him and exposing themselves to his condem-

nation, our condition would be very miserable, if God did not give us some other light. Age after age men would become more and more sinful, and would all be without any hope of salvation. Now, that men are actually going on in this manner is, I think, evident from facts. I do not say that there is no moral virtue in man. This would not be true. I say that the law of God requires perfect obedience, in order to deserve any reward at his hands. And I say, not only that men do not render that obedience, but that they have disobeyed him so much, as not even to perceive, by the light of conscience, the very duties that he requires of them.

1. There are many duties to his fellow-creatures and to God, which man, by his unassisted conscience, does not discover. This must be known to every young person who has read the accounts given by travellers of heathen nations; especially those given by Christian missionaries.

2. It is also evident that where these duties are known, men, very frequently, if left to the light of nature, err in respect to the mode in which they are to be performed. Thus the heathen, who acknowledge that they ought to worship God, perform, as acts of worship, the most disgraceful and abominable rites. While

they confess that they ought to love their parents and children, they, not unfrequently, put them to death when they are aged or sick.

3. Men universally admit that they do not live according to the light which they enjoy ; that is, that they are not as good as they know how to be. This is confessed, both by the heathen, and also by those who live under the full influence of Christianity. Every one knows it to be the fact that men are disposed to violate their obligations to God for the sake of the most transient and trifling gratification.

Now, if this be the fact, if we be thus disposed to violate the law of God, and if to every violation he has affixed a most solemn penalty, not only in this world, but also in the other, if he had given us no other mode of learning our duty than is afforded by the light of conscience, our condition would be exceedingly hopeless.

Now, as we know God to be infinitely merciful, as well as infinitely just, it is surely not improbable that he would give us some additional knowledge upon this subject. He has given abundant proofs that he loves to have his creatures do right ; and also that he loves to see them happy. Both of these facts would lead us to expect some more explicit informa-

tion respecting our duty than is given by our unassisted conscience.

This additional information is communicated to us by natural and revealed religion.

QUESTIONS.

1. Explain what would be the condition of men, if they possessed no other knowledge of duty than that derived from the light of unassisted conscience.

2. It is said that men, without any other light than conscience, would be ignorant of many duties to God and to man. Can you give an example of this?

3. It is said that men, when they know that some duty is to be discharged, do not know how to discharge it acceptably to God. Give examples of this.

4. Do you find men generally acting as well as they know how to act? How do you act yourself?

5. If God should call you to account for all those actions of your life which you have performed contrary to his will without thinking anything about it, what would be your condition?

6. If we are so ignorant and sinful, and God is both very kind and very desirous that we should do right, what should we think it probable that he would do for us?

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE NATURE AND THE DEFECTS OF NATURAL RELIGION.

IN order to illustrate the nature of natural religion, I will commence with the following

supposition. Suppose that any young person had the misfortune to be deaf and dumb, as some children are. Such a child we know could not hear a word that his parents said to him. Suppose that his parents were very wise, just, and kind persons, and that the child knew this perfectly well. Now suppose this child to observe that whenever he did some sort of actions, as, for instance, was angry, mischievous, or dishonest, his parents were displeased, and if he repeated the actions punished him; while, if he were kind, obliging and honest, his parents were always pleased and rewarded him. And suppose that he also found that his parents, by some means, always so contrived that a good action should be followed by a great deal of happiness to the whole family; and a bad action by unhappiness to the whole family. Now suppose all this were invariably to happen, such a child would as certainly know what its parents wished, that is, what were the laws of the family, as though he could hear, and they had informed him by language.

Now this is precisely the case with what is called natural religion; by which we mean those notions of their duty to God and to each other which men might acquire without the Bible.

God acts towards all men as I have supposed such a parent to act towards such a child. He has connected happiness with some actions, and misery with others, if we consider the actions only in respect to ourselves. Thus, he has made us feel the *pain* of conscience when we do some things, and the *pleasure* of conscience when we do other things. Besides, he has made some actions give us pain and distress, and others give us pleasure, in our bodies as well as in our minds. Every one knows that if he eats too much, it makes him sick. Every one knows how miserable drunkenness makes a man. Every one knows that a liar is despised by every person. And still more, God has so arranged things in this world, that bad actions make every one else unhappy, and that, if bad actions were universally practised, men could not live together. Consider for a moment how unhappy children make their parents, by disobedience, lying, using bad words, and quarrelling with each other. And ask yourselves, how could men live together, if they were all liars, and all drunkards, and all thieves.

Now, since God has connected such bad consequences with all these actions, and with a multitude of others, it is as manifest that he wishes us to avoid them as though he had

spoken from heaven, and told us so. And, since he has connected so many good consequences with the contrary actions, it is equally evident that he means us to do the contrary actions. Hence, men, by observing these consequences, can learn what God wishes them to do, and what he wishes them to avoid. And these rules, thus ascertained, form what are called the laws of natural religion.

It is evident that much knowledge of our duty may be learned in this way. And from what we have already said, it is evident that for all this increased knowledge, man is, in an increased degree, accountable; since his guilt in violating any command of God is always in proportion to the clearness with which that command has been made known to him. And still further, not only does natural religion present the moral law with additional clearness, by showing us the consequences of our actions, it offers additional motives to the doing of our duty. And, as our tendency to do wrong or right is shown by the obstacles which we overcome in the course which we pursue, if we do wrong, in opposition to those additional motives, we are justly held additionally guilty by our Creator.

While, however, there is so much light communicated by natural religion, it is, in our

present state, defective, and insufficient to lead man to virtue and happiness.

This may be clearly shown from facts.

1. Mankind, wherever they have lived without the Bible, have always been exceedingly vicious.

2. Nor has this been owing to want of knowledge, for, the further they have advanced in knowledge, the more wicked have they become.

3. None of the systems of religion which men have derived from the light of nature, have had any perceptible effect in rendering them better.

But, specially, natural religion can give us no information respecting the truths most essential to the formation of a religious character, and to the possession of a firm hope of a blessed immortality.

For instance, natural religion gives us no information respecting the existence and duration of the future state; it neither tells us whether we live after death, nor how long we live.

It gives no information respecting the state upon which we enter after death. It teaches us much respecting our sinfulness, but nothing respecting the way in which sin may be pardoned. And, specially, it tells us nothing

respecting the way of salvation by Jesus Christ. Hence, as all these are facts of the utmost possible importance for us to know, and as none of them either are revealed, or can be revealed by natural religion, it is evident that, had we no other guide, we must be left in utter ignorance on the most important subjects, which we need, as immortal and moral beings, to know. It is to dissipate this darkness, and to give us all the knowledge on moral subjects that our present state demands, that God has given to us the Holy Scriptures.

QUESTIONS.

1. How may we know, without the Bible, what God wishes us to do, and what to avoid?

2. How would you know, in this manner, that God did not mean men to get drunk, or to steal, or to fight?

3. How would you know, in this manner, that God meant children to be kind to each other, and to obey their parents?

4. Is this mode of teaching found to be sufficient to make men good? Do you remember anything on this subject from your reading?

5. What was the moral character of the ancient Greeks and Romans?

6. What is the moral character of the heathen generally?

7. How could we know anything about another world, except God had told us in the Bible?

8. Can we learn anything except the commands of God, from natural religion? Illustrate this.

9. Does natural religion give us any knowledge respecting pardon, after we have broken the laws of God?

10. If men have not the Bible, by what law will God judge them?



CHAPTER VII.

OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

THE Holy Scriptures are contained in the volumes of the Old and New Testaments. The main design of these is to reveal to man the will or law of God, and the way of salvation from sin, by the atonement of Jesus Christ.

The Old Testament contains,

1. An account of the creation of the world, of the creation and fall of man, with a brief history of our race, until the general deluge.

2. An account of the separation of the family of Abraham, the commencement of a nation, and a history of this nation, from its beginning, until the return from the captivity in Babylon, a period of about fifteen hundred years.

3. The system of laws, moral, civil, and ceremonial, which God enacted for the government of this people, and which he ordained principally for the sake of prefiguring the coming dispensation.

4. Various events in their history, discourses of their inspired teachers, prayers and hymns of pious men, predictions of future events, and, specially, full and minute prophecies of the coming Messiah, and of the nature, the glory, and the benefits of his reign. With these last the Old Testament is tinged throughout; and with these anticipations large portions of it are entirely occupied. The teaching of the Old Testament shows that no system of law, even under the most favorable circumstances, is adequate to the moral reformation of man.

The design of the New Testament is, to make known the law of God with greater clearness than it was formerly revealed; and, specially, to teach men the way of salvation by the gospel of Jesus Christ.

In pursuance of this design it contains.

1. A narrative of the life and death, resurrection and ascension, of Jesus of Nazareth; a Being in whom the divine and human natures were mysteriously united; who appeared on earth to teach us whatever was necessary to be known of our duties to God; and, by his obedience and sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension and mediation, to provide for us a way of pardon and salvation.

2. A brief narrative of the progress of the

Christian religion, for several years, after the ascension of Jesus of Nazareth.

3. The epistolary instructions which his apostles, by divine inspiration, gave to the men of their own time.

This whole volume, thus taken together, presents us with all the knowledge we could desire, respecting our duties to God, our future destiny, and the way of pardon and acceptance with our Father in heaven. And, hence, we believe the Old and New Testaments to contain all that God has ever revealed, or will reveal to us, respecting his will. What is contained here, and nothing else, is, therefore, binding upon the conscience. Everything else is the word of man.

We see, then, the means which God has given, for the purpose of enabling us to know our duty to him and to each other.

1. He has given us conscience, by which we become sensible of our duty, and by which we are admonished to act in accordance with it.

2. He has so constructed all the system of things around us, that we enjoy happiness whenever we do his will, and suffer pain whenever we violate it. Hence, if we will only observe the effects of an action upon ourselves,

and upon others, we may thus learn how he wishes us to act.

3. When, by our own wickedness, our conscience became imperfect, and when we ceased to learn our duty by the light of nature, he gave to man a written law, in which he clearly communicated by language his will concerning us.

4. When this was found entirely insufficient to restrain men from vice, or to restore them to virtue, in the fulness of time God sent forth his Son, to teach us our duty, to make an atonement for our sins, and to offer pardon and eternal life to every one who will repent and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ.

If such be the fact, it is manifest that our accountability increases with every additional portion of moral light. And if he be inexcusable who disobeys the will of God under any circumstances, how solemn must be the condemnation of those who, under the clear light of the gospel, and in despite of the merciful provisions of the new dispensation, pursue a course of thoughtless disobedience to God, and live for this world, instead of living for another.

Now, young persons frequently suppose that all this is intended for others, but not for them. But it is not so. Does not the *con-*

science of every young person admonish him? Cannot every young person see the misery which is produced by wickedness, in himself and in others? Cannot every one, in this country, read the Bible; and has he not read there, of God's anger against sin, and also of the way of salvation by Christ? If this be so, every young person is as truly accountable to God for the knowledge which he has obtained as if he were ever so old. Every one of us, whether young or old, ought to repent of his sins, obey God, and believe on the Saviour. And, if the young do not understand these things, they should apply to their teachers, their parents, or their minister for instruction.

QUESTIONS.

1. In what books of the Bible do we find the early history of the race of man?
2. In what books do we find the history of the Jews, from the departure out of Egypt, until the captivity?
3. In what books do we find the Mosaic law?
4. What is the difference between moral, civil, and ceremonial law?
5. What book is filled with the prayers and praises of pious men?
6. What book contains the most distinct and minute prophecies of the mission, character, and life of Christ?
7. What books in the New Testament contain the life of Christ?

8. What book contains the history of the progress of Christianity, after his ascension?

9. Explain the modes which God has given by which we may know our duty.

10. Why are those, in this country, who disobey God, more wicked than those who disobey him among the heathen?

11. Is a young person who disobeys God any more excusable than an old person?

PART II.

OF THE DUTIES OF MAN TO GOD AND HIS FELLOW-MAN.

IN the preceding pages we have endeavored to illustrate the nature of man's moral constitution, and to show the sources from which his moral light is derived. We shall now attempt a brief exposition of human duty, so far as it can be learned either from natural religion or from Divine revelation.

The Scriptures teach us that the whole of human duty may be summed up in the single word LOVE. "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart;" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Hence the duties of man are comprehended under two general divisions :

1. Love to God, or piety.
2. Love to man, or morality.

Of these we shall now proceed to treat.

OF LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY.

CHAPTER I.

OF OUR OBLIGATION TO LOVE GOD.

EVERY one, as soon as he thinks upon the subject, knows that he ought to love and obey God. But men, generally, have very indistinct notions respecting the meaning of these terms. While they confess that they ought to love and obey their Creator, they act in direct opposition to his will, and do not seem to think that they are violating any duty. It may be worth while, therefore, to attempt to illustrate, so far as we can, the nature of our obligations to God.

1. I suppose that every well-instructed young person feels that he ought to love and obey his parents. And he feels this, because they are *his parents*, that is, although other persons may be equally wise and good, he feels under greater obligations to his parents than to any one else. Who has not been shocked to observe the manner in which wicked and

badly educated young persons speak of these, their best earthly friends? Have you not observed that such young persons are commonly ill-bred, vicious and disagreeable associates?

2. But suppose that our parents were also the wisest, and most virtuous, and most benevolent persons that we had ever known. Our obligations to them would be certainly increased. In addition to our love of them because they were our parents, we should love them for their virtues. What would we think of a child who, though blessed with such parents, showed by his conduct that he cared nothing for them, never took their advice, nor associated with them any more than he could help, but was always seeking his companions among the most idle, vicious, and disgusting persons in the neighborhood?

3. But suppose, once more, that such a child was very sickly, or was blind and deaf, and that all these excellent virtues of his parents had uniformly been employed for his good. Suppose that, for several years, when he was so sick as to be very near to death, his mother had watched by his bed-side, relieved his pain, and saved him from the grave. Suppose that his father had carried him about in his arms, whenever he was able to go abroad, and when he was unable had always provided

him with companions, and everything to make him happy at home. And suppose, moreover, that such a parent, being rich, had built a splendid and beautiful house, precisely adapted to render this helpless child happy. What should we think of such a child, if, even in his blindness, he wished to escape from his parents, to go where they had forbidden him, and continually to injure himself and others, in spite of all their care? What should we think of him, if he never manifested any gratitude for all this kindness, and habitually, not only grieved these parents, but showed, by all his conduct, that he loved the vilest persons better than them? Every one must acknowledge, that such a child was not only very foolish, but very wicked.

And, on the contrary, suppose a child, under these circumstances, to cherish proper feelings towards his parents; every one must see how he would conduct towards them. Inasmuch as they were his *parents*, he would honor, respect and obey them. As they were the most wise and virtuous persons he knew, he would take their advice and counsel in preference to those of any one else, and would prefer their society to any other. As they had taken every possible means to promote his happiness, he would be grateful to them, would do everything to

please them, and would a great deal rather please them than please himself or any of his acquaintances. Now, I think that every one, whether young or old, must see that this is the way in which such a child ought to conduct towards such parents.

Let us now, in the *second place*, apply these remarks to our *relations to God*, and every one must see that we are under infinitely higher obligations to love and obey him, than we possibly can be to any or to all the other beings in existence.

1. He is our Creator and Preserver. By him, we, with all the faculties which we possess, were first formed out of nothing, and by him we are every moment supported. Without his power, we could neither see nor hear, taste nor feel; we could neither think nor remember, be pleased nor displeased, love nor be loved. All that we have is his, and all that we are is produced from nothingness by his simple will. Now, surely the Being whose we are, in so special a manner, is deserving of our reverence. He who sustains us every moment ought every moment to be present to our thoughts.

2. But more than this, consider the attributes of God, and ask if we ought so constantly to think of him, *how* ought we to think of him. He is infinitely wise, faithful, just, holy and

merciful. If we are bound by our moral nature to love and reverence these attributes everywhere on earth ; if we are specially bound to reverence them in our parents, how much more are we bound to love and reverence them in our Father who is in heaven, and who possesses them in a degree as far beyond anything that exists on earth as the Creator is superior to any one of his creatures.

3. And still further : all these attributes of the Creator have, from the beginning, been exerted for our happiness. We are as ignorant of the future as a blind man can be of the objects around him ; and yet God has provided everything for us. We are as liable every moment to death as a person in the most dangerous illness ; and yet God has kept us alive to the present hour. We have no power to create anything around us ; and yet God has created this goodly world, and provided it for our special happiness. We are shortly to die ; and he has provided for those that love him, a world of happiness, vastly more glorious and excellent than anything that we can conceive of. When we were all sinners, and exposed to his just displeasure, he so loved the world, that he sent his well-beloved Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life. Now, surely all this

deserves our love and gratitude. And, if our love and gratitude should be in proportion to the character of the benefactor, and to that of the benefits conferred, then, surely, we should love our Father in heaven infinitely better than anything else; in other words, we should love him with all our heart; that is, supremely.

And suppose, thirdly, that we really cherished those feelings of reverence, and love, and gratitude to God which he deserves, how is it proper that we should discover them?

Manifestly, since everything around us is the work of God, and is designed to keep him constantly in our recollection, everything should put us in mind of him.

1. If we thus thought of him, his attributes would perpetually fill us with wonder, admiration and love. As all this is done *for us*, every favor from his hand would excite us to gratitude and adoration. Nor is this all. As all that is adorable in the Deity is infinitely superior to any exhibition of goodness that we see on earth, and as he is infinitely more nearly related to us than any created beings are, not only would these feelings be constant, but they would also be infinitely more intense than those which we cherish to any and to all beings beside.

2. And again, suppose all this to be the case,

it is manifest that such a state of feeling would have a powerful effect upon our conduct. Loving, thus, a just and merciful and holy being, we should love to act justly, and mercifully, and holily. And loving him thus intensely and gratefully, we should desire, above all things, that he should love us ; for this is the very nature of every affection. Hence we should in everything strive to act in such a manner as we knew would please him. Hence, we should strive, most of all, to know and do his will. And if we had these sentiments towards him, we should never prefer anything to him. To all the allurements of pleasure, or interest, or passion, it would always be more than a sufficient answer, how can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?

3. And hence, as our supreme desire would be to please God, we should employ our intellect in nothing so readily, cheerfully, and spontaneously, as in learning his will, both as it is made known to us in his works, and in the Bible. We should delight to observe his dealings with men and with nations, that we might learn the rules by which he governs us. And we should specially study, with intense interest, his written word, that we might know his will concerning us here, as well as what he has prepared for us hereafter. And having once

known this will, the first and strongest impulse of our hearts would be to obey it; no matter what, or how many, or how strong impulses might exist to the contrary.

4. And, again, if such were the case, as everything which God has made teaches his attributes, and so, of course, is intended to lead our thoughts to him, the strongest incitement to knowledge would be that thus we might know more of the works and character of him who made us, and made all things. And yet more, as this would be our strongest incitement to improve in knowledge, this would be the natural end to which all our knowledge would tend. The colors of the rainbow, the odor of the rose, the sublimity of the storm, the thunder of the cataract, would as directly and instantly awaken the emotion of religion, as they do the emotion of beauty or of sublimity. Thus should we have the perpetual and delightful consciousness of the fact that in God we live and move and have our being.

5. And, again, as God has condescended to reveal himself more intimately in his written word; as there he has communicated to us more glorious knowledge of his character, and has been pleased to converse with us in our own language, and has, moreover, given us a divine example of the manner in which he would have

us live, and has informed us that he is pleased to have us converse with him by prayer, and meditation, and commune with him by the utterance of all the feelings of a devout spirit; it is manifest, that, with a proper and filial temper, these would be among the choicest of our privileges, and they would be as natural to us as the intercourse of intimate friends with each other, or as that of children with beloved and endeared parents.

That such are the proper feelings which a creature, such as man, should cherish towards such a Creator as God, is, I think, too evident to need argument. I will not, in this place, go into a consideration of the question, how far we see these feelings exemplified in the character and actions of men. I presume it will be at once admitted that the world presents but little evidence of the universality of such moral dispositions. All ages and nations have united in the conviction that man is a sinner, and that his moral feelings towards God are very different from those which he is under the highest obligations to render to such a Creator.

Suppose this to be the case, it is proper to inquire, lastly, what are the dispositions suitable for us to exercise towards God, after we have become sinners against him.

1. It is manifest, that, although we have

changed, God has not changed. His attributes are the same, and are as lovely, and his conduct towards us has been as just and as good, as they were before. We are then under precisely the same obligations as before to love and obey him, and to strive after the same moral perfection, as if we had never transgressed.

2. If God has been thus unchangeably just and holy and good, our sin against him must have been inexcusably wrong. This, then, it becomes us to acknowledge, and to justify him, as well as condemn ourselves. We ought, in sincere sorrow for all our past offences, to break off from everything that has displeased him, and devote ourselves, as was our duty at the beginning, to a life of sincere and filial and universal obedience. This is what the Bible means by repentance.

3. And still more, if there be a way of pardon provided by our Father in heaven, a way in which alone he will receive us to favor, after we have sinned against him, it becomes us to seek, most earnestly and honestly, to know what that way is, and submit to the wise and merciful conditions which he has prescribed for our salvation. If we neglect this, we are guilty, not only of our past sins against God, but also of continuing in our present state of

sin, notwithstanding our Creator has provided a means of deliverance from it, and a way of pardon, full, free, and upon the most reasonable and merciful conditions that we can possibly conceive of. Of the wickedness of such a course of conduct, the Bible always speaks in the most decided terms. "If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin." "This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men have loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil."

From what has been said, it will be evident that our relations to God impose upon us the following obligations :

1. To love him supremely, that is, better than all things else, and to love nothing in such a manner, or in such a degree, as shall interfere with our love to him.

2. To obey him in all things implicitly, though in opposition to our own desires, passions and wills ; and though all the other beings in the universe were opposed to us.

3. To cherish, habitually, a contrite and penitent disposition, on account of our innumerable past and present offences.

4. To accept of the mercy which he has provided, on the terms which he has pre-

scribed. Or, in general, to live a pious, penitent and religious life.

And lastly; as every action which we perform must be, in some manner, either according to the will of God or contrary to it, our duties to man become also duties to God. That is to say, whatever we are under obligations to perform, from our relations to man, we are also under obligations to perform from our relations to God, because God requires it of us. Hence we see that a difference exists between our duties to God *simply*, and our duties to man, *which are also duties to God*. The first are not capable of being enforced by human law. The others may be so enforced, and the violation of them justly punished. They are, however, punished by man, not because of their being displeasing to God, but because they violate the obligations under which man is placed to his fellow.

QUESTIONS.

1. Do you ever feel as much your obligations to love and serve God, as you do your obligations to love and obey your parents?
2. How would a wicked and disobedient child act towards kind and good parents?
3. How would a good and obedient child act towards good and kind parents?
4. Which is most truly our parent, God, or our father and mother?

5. Which is kindest and wisest and best to us, God, or our earthly parents?

6. Which are we under the greatest obligations to love, God, or our parents?

7. How do we act towards God; as affectionate and obedient children, or as ungrateful and disobedient children?

8. Mention some of the reasons for which we ought to love and obey God.

9. How would a person act who really loved and served God?

10. If we really love God, what should be our desire in all we do?

11. Does our being sinners excuse us from our obligations to love and obey God?

12. If we are sinners, and are under the same obligations to love him as before, are we not also under some other obligation? What is it?

13. Under what obligations are we placed by the fact that God has given his Son to die for us?

14. Suppose we continue to live wickedly, shall we be any *better* off than we should have been if there had been no Saviour appointed?

15. Shall we, on this account, be any *worse* off? Why?

16. What does the Bible represent to be the great difference, in guilt, between the heathen and those who have heard the gospel?

17. Mention, in order, the duties which we owe to God.

18. What is idolatry?

19. Can a person be an idolater who does not worship an image or a picture?

20. When we want to do anything very much, is this

a sufficient reason for doing it? Why? What ought to control our desires?

21. Can we love God if we thoughtlessly, and without regret, sin against him? How should we feel when we have sinned against him?

22. Can we love God, if we lie, disobey our parents, use bad words, or take his name in vain?

23. Give an example of some act which is merely a duty to God, and another which is a duty to man, and is also required by God.

24. Has man any right to enforce those duties which are simple duties to God?



CHAPTER II.

OF PRAYER.

SECTION I.

THE NATURE OF PRAYER.

As devout affections towards God are of the utmost importance to the formation of virtuous character, God has been pleased to appoint special means for the purpose of assisting us to cultivate them. These are, prayer and the observance of the sabbath. In the present chapter we shall treat of prayer.

We shall consider, 1st, the nature; 2d, the obligation; 3d, the utility of prayer.

Prayer is the direct intercourse of our

spirits with the spiritual and unseen Creator. "God is a Spirit, and those that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

Just as a dutiful and affectionate child unbosoms all his cares and sorrows and wants, and confesses all his errors, in the presence of wise and virtuous and beloved parents; so every one of us is invited to draw near and commune with our Father in Heaven by prayer and supplication.

This temper of mind required in prayer supposes a solemn conviction of the character and attributes of God, — a consciousness of the obligations which we are under to him, — an affecting view of our sinfulness and helplessness, — sincere gratitude for all the favors which we have received from him, — a fixed resolution to keep all his commandments, — submission to his will, — confidence in his veracity, — importunate desires for spiritual blessings, and a soul at peace with all mankind. It is not asserted that all these dispositions are always to be in exercise at the same time, but only such of them as belong to the nature of our supplications; and that we should be conscious of nothing at variance with any of them. It is prayer offered in this spirit which God has promised to answer.

Prayer may be either private, domestic, or social.

1. Private prayer. As, in private prayer, our object is, to hold personal and direct communion with God, we are commanded, on such occasions, to enter into our closet, and shut the door, and pray to our Father in secret. The expression of our wants should be solemn, but unreserved and particular. As, moreover, this communion with God is intended to be the great means for resisting the constant pressure of things seen and temporal, it should be frequent and habitual. Thus says David, evening and morning and at noon will I call upon thee.

2. Domestic prayer. As the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister, are the most intimate and endearing of any which we sustain on earth; and as, in consequence of these relations, almost all the joys and sorrows which we sustain individually are shared in common with those who are thus connected with us, it is peculiarly proper that we should, *together*, spread our wants and necessities and thanksgivings before God. The moral effect of this institution upon both parents and children is also such as to render it obligatory upon every thoughtful parent.

3. Social prayer. As members of the same community we are continually receiving social

blessings from our Creator. It is proper that as societies we should acknowledge them. Religion tends to unite men together by the effort to do good to each other. It is therefore cultivated by meeting together as religious societies. So important is this to the improvement of the moral cultivation of a community, that nowhere has any successful effort been made for the improvement of man without it. Surely nothing more need be said of the importance of social worship.

QUESTIONS.

1. For what reasons does God require us to pray?
2. Tell what prayer is, in your own language.
3. What is there, in our ordinary intercourse with others, which resembles prayer?
4. What do you mean by an affecting view of our sinfulness?
5. What favors do we receive from God? Mention some of them.
6. What do you mean by unshaken confidence in God's veracity?
7. What do you mean by submission to the will of God?
8. What do you mean by a soul at peace with all mankind?
9. Where are we told that unless we forgive men their trespasses, neither will our Father in heaven forgive our trespasses?
10. Suppose that when we pray, we feel angry or revengeful against any one, will God answer our prayers?

11. Explain, in your own language, how we ought to feel when we pray to God.

12. How ought young persons to behave when their parents pray in the family?

13. Ought all parents to pray with their children?

SECTION II.

OF THE DUTY OF PRAYER

This is evident from the relations in which we stand to God.

1. We are utterly powerless, absolutely ignorant of the future, and essentially dependent upon God for our very existence, and, of course, for every blessing which accompanies existence. What can be more proper than that we daily supplicate our Father in heaven for the blessings which we every moment need; and that we humbly and thankfully acknowledge the favors, which we, without any claim on our part, every moment receive?

2. But specially is this the case when we remember that we are sinners, that we have forfeited all claim to the favor, and deserve the displeasure of God; that we need his pardon for our daily offences, and the purifying influences of his Spirit to cleanse us from our sinful dispositions, and prepare us for a holy and happy immortality.

3. This habit of reliance upon God is necessary to our happiness in the present state.

4. The tempers of mind which prayer supposes are essential to our progress in virtue.

The duty of prayer is also abundantly taught in the Scriptures.

1. It is frequently expressly commanded. This is evident from such passages as these: "Pray without ceasing." "In everything giving thanks, for this is the will of God in Christ Jesus concerning you." "In all things, by prayer and supplication, let your requests be made known unto God." "I exhort that prayers and supplications, intercessions and giving of thanks be made for all men; for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour." Our blessed Saviour spake a parable to this end, "that men ought always to pray and never to faint."

2. God declares in the Scriptures that this is the condition on which he will bestow favors upon men. "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him." "The effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." "Ask, and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened. Or what

man is there of you, who, if his son ask bread, will give him a stone, or if he ask a fish, will give him a serpent? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give good gifts to them that ask him.”

3. The Scriptures declare that the habit of prayer distinguishes the righteous from the wicked. “The *wicked* say, what is the Almighty that we should serve him, or what profit shall we have if we call upon him?” “The wicked through the pride of his countenance will not seek after God. God is not in all his thoughts.” On the contrary, those whom God approves are frequently designated as “those that call upon,” and “those that seek him.”

4. The Bible abounds with examples of special answers to prayer under every variety of circumstances. Witness the prayer of Abraham for Sodom; — the prayer of the Israelites when under bondage in Egypt; — the prayer of Moses for the Israelites in the wilderness; — the prayer of Elijah for drought and for rain; — the prayer of Nehemiah for the restoration of the Jews; — the prayer of Daniel for the same object, and for divine illumination respecting the purposes of God. What God has thus encouraged is not merely

a duty, it is a most inestimable and unspeakable privilege. In a word, what can be so rich a privilege as the opportunity afforded to blind, sinful, helpless man, to go, with all his wants, and cares, and sorrows, to an infinitely wise, benevolent and compassionate Creator; with the assurance that he that cometh shall in no wise be cast out; that whatever he suitably asks for, he shall, if it be best for him, receive; and that God will even reward such an one for the very act of thus coming to him?

QUESTIONS.

1. Explain, in your own language, why we ought to pray to God, on account of our condition as *creatures*?

2. Explain, in your own language, why we ought to pray to God on account of our condition as *sinner*s?

3. Of what value are the tempers of mind which prayer requires?

4. What would be the difference between a man who had these tempers of mind, and one who had them not?

5. What is the parable by which our Saviour taught men always to pray and not to faint? Can you repeat it?

6. What encouragements do the Scriptures offer to prayer?

7. Why does prayer distinguish a good from a bad man?

8. What encouragement to pray do we receive from the prayer of Abraham?

9. What does God say to Moses respecting the prayer of the children of Israel, in Egypt?

10. What does the Apostle James say respecting the prayer of Elias?

11. Where is the prayer of Nehemiah for the restoration of the Jews; and how was this prayer answered?

12. How was the prayer of Daniel for divine illumination, answered?

13. Did Daniel do right in praying to God, when the law of the king forbade him?

14. What are we to learn from this?

15. Would you not lose a great deal, if you were never to ask your parents for anything, and never thank them for anything?

16. Must not people lose a good deal more, who never ask God for anything, and never thank him for anything?

SECTION III.

THE UTILITY OF PRAYER.

After what has been already said, but little need be added on this subject. We shall only remark, that the utility of prayer may be seen,

1. From the tempers of mind, which, as we have before said, it supposes. Every one must acknowledge that whatever produces such tempers of mind must be of the greatest use to a moral and accountable creature.

2. God has made it the condition on which, alone, we can expect the blessings which we need. Not that we never receive any favors that we do not pray for, but that God *promises* to bestow them on no other condition;

and that he declares that he will bestow favors on those who pray, which he will not bestow on those who do not pray.

And that he should do this, is surely very reasonable. A parent may bestow necessary food, and clothing, and care upon all his children, but surely he would be a very unjust and unwise parent, if he did not make a difference in his treatment of his children, according to their character; that is, if he did not, by his conduct, show approbation of the obedient and thankful, and disapprobation of the disobedient and unthankful.

That, however, a man shall receive all, and at the very time, and in the very manner, in which he asks for it, is not asserted. It is asserted that he who asks in a proper temper, committing all his affairs in pious submission to an all-wise, compassionate and faithful God, is assured that God will take the charge of them, and direct them for the best good of the suppliant. No reasonable and pious person could ask for anything more. The answer to our prayers, for particular *temporal* blessings, is therefore to be expected only contingently; that is, if it be for our best good. But as *spiritual* blessings, that is, our own moral improvement, are undoubtedly for our best good, he who asks for these will as-

surely be answered, in his own personal progress in virtue.

Since the relations of all men to God are essentially the same, all equally stand in need of prayer, and will all equally perish if they live prayerlessly. It is the duty, therefore, of all men, of young and old, of wise and unwise, to pray. Neither pressure of other duties, nor weight of responsibility, forms any excuse for the neglect of it. For, the more numerous and important our duties, the more solemn will be our account; and the more imperative is our need of divine assistance. Nor is youth any excuse for this neglect, unless our ignorance and weakness and helplessness be a reason why we should not apply for assistance to that Being, in whom, by the necessity of his nature, reside the exhaustless treasures of infinite wisdom and everlasting strength.

QUESTIONS.

1. Will you not wish, when you come to die, that you had cultivated such dispositions as are required of us when we pray?

2. Have you any reason to hope that your sins will be forgiven, and that you will be prepared for heaven, if you do not pray? Why?

3. Is it not right, that God should bestow favors upon those that pray, which he would not bestow upon those who do not pray?

4. When God promises that he will answer prayer, does he mean that he will always give us all that we ask for?

5. What does he mean?

6. What blessings does he promise, without reserve, that he will give us if we ask for them?

7. Do young persons stand in need of prayer as much as those that are older?

8. Is our *business* any excuse for not devoting time to pray to God? Why?

9. Are our *studies* any excuse for this neglect?

10. Is our play any excuse for it?

11. Is it any excuse for this neglect, that we do not want to pray?

12. Can we form any estimate of our character from our habits in this respect?

13. Suppose we pray, without any of the proper tempers of mind, will it do us any good?

14. Is there any man who ought not to pray?



CHAPTER III.

THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH.

ALTHOUGH the sabbath is a positive institution, and the proof of its obligation is to be sought for in the Scriptures, yet there are evident indications that a portion of our time is necessary for rest from labor. Animals and men who enjoy one day in seven as a period of rest will endure hardship better, and will accomplish more labor in a year, than those

who are worked every day without intermission.

We shall, in this chapter, consider the instructions of the Scriptures on this subject; *first*, as to the institution of the day, and *second*, as to the manner in which it is to be observed.

SECTION I.

OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE SABBATH.

The first reference to this institution is found in Gen. ii. 1—3. “Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the hosts of them. And on the seventh day, God ended his works which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day from all his works which he had made. And God *blessed* the seventh day, and *sanctified* it; because that *in it* he had rested from all his works which God created and made.”

Now concerning this passage we remark:

1. It is an institution of God. *God* blessed it.

2. As it was given to our *first parents*, it was given to the whole human race.

3. God *blessed it*, that is, made it a day of peculiar blessing to man. He *sanctified* it, that is, set it apart from a common to a sacred use.

4. The nature of the ordinance is general. God sanctified *it*, that is, the day. The act has reference to no particular people, but to the day itself.

5. The object for which the day is set apart is general. If it be rest, all men need it. If it be moral cultivation, or the use of the day for religious purposes, they all equally require such a service.

There are indications that such a day was observed, before the giving of the law.

1. Gen. iv. 3. Cain and Abel brought in *process of time*, or “at the end,” or “cutting off of days,” an offering unto the Lord. The term cutting off, or section of days, seems naturally to refer to the sabbath, or close of the week.

2. Noah seems to have observed the division of time into weeks. This is evident from the periods which he suffered to elapse between the sending out of the dove. Gen. viii. 10—12. He also entered into the ark seven days before the flood came. Gen. vii. 4—10.

The next mention of the sabbath is made shortly after the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt. Ex. xvi. 22—23. “And it came to pass, that on the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread, two omers for one

man, and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses. And he said unto them, this is that which the Lord hath said, to-morrow is the rest of the holy sabbath unto the Lord.”

Concerning this passage I remark :

1. That as it occurs before the giving of the law, the obligatoriness of the sabbath is recognized irrespective of the law.

2. Moses speaks of the sabbath as an institution of which they ought to have known ; and on which they might have expected the occurrence which took place. He reproves them as erring in despite of knowledge, although he had before, in this connection, given no directions respecting the sabbath.

The division of time into seven days is moreover very common among all ancient nations. This seems to indicate that they all received this institution from the same source, although the religious observance of it had been gradually neglected..

From these facts I think we may conclude that the sabbath was originally given to the whole human race, and that it was observed by the Hebrews previously to the giving of the law ; and that, in early ages, this observance was probably universal.

OF THE MOSAIC SABBATH.

The precept for the observance of the sabbath, at the giving of the law, is in these words: "Remember the sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work, but the seventh is the sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man servant, nor thy maid servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates, for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day. Wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh day and hallowed it." Ex. xx. 11. In addition to the observance of this as a day of rest, it was also appointed as a day for religious services. Lev. xxiii. 3. "The seventh day is a sabbath of rest, a holy convocation." The sabbath was thus observed by the Jews in the days of the Apostles. "Moses, of old time, hath in every city those that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath day." Acts xv. 21.

Now, inasmuch as, 1st, this precept belongs to the law of the ten commandments, of which all the others are considered universally obligatory; 2d, as the reasons given are the same as those for its original institution; and 3d,

as we find it frequently referred to in the Prophets as one of the moral laws of God, we conclude that it is of unchangeable obligation.

OF THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH.

If the command to observe the sabbath is universally obligatory, the only question which remains to be considered is, why Christians observe the first day of the week instead of the seventh.

The reason for this is found in the examples of inspired Apostles, and of the early Christians.

1. That early Christians, with the sanction of the Apostles, were accustomed to meet statedly to worship God and to celebrate the Lord's Supper, is evident from 1 Cor. xi. 20, xiv. 23—40. And that these meetings were on the first day of the week is evident from 1 Cor. xvi. 1—2; Acts xx 6—11. At the time of the writing of the Revelations, this day had already obtained that name, by which it was ever afterwards distinguished. - "I was in the Spirit on the *Lord's day*."

From this' period, the notices of this day are abundant, in all the Christian writers. They allude to the keeping of the first day as the day of our Lord's resurrection. So universal was their practice of observing it as a

day of religious worship, that it was thus spoken of by the Roman magistrates; and was one common means of convicting them of Christianity.

Now, the example of inspired men is sufficient to prove that the keeping of this day is acceptable to God. Nay, as it was kept by the Apostles and primitive Christians in the place of the other, we seem under some moral obligation to follow their example. Specially would this be the case when, by keeping the first day in preference to the seventh, we can better attain the end for which the institution was established.

QUESTIONS.

1. What do you mean by saying that the sabbath is a *positive* institution?
2. Repeat the passage in which the institution of the sabbath is first recorded.
3. Why do we suppose that it was given to the whole human race?
4. What is meant by *sanctifying* the sabbath?
5. What reasons have we for supposing that the sabbath was observed before the time of Moses?
6. What do we learn from the *manner* in which the sabbath is first mentioned in the wilderness?
7. Repeat the commandment in the law, in which the keeping of the sabbath is enjoined.
8. How was the sabbath kept among the Jews, besides being observed as a day of rest?

9. What was the example of the inspired Apostles respecting the day to be kept for worship?

10. What was the example of the early Christians, and of Christians since that time?

11. If we are at liberty to keep either the seventh or the first day, which day, as Christians, should we wish to keep?

SECTION II.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SABBATH IS TO BE OBSERVED.

1. The law of the sabbath forbids all labor either of body or mind. "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work. But the seventh is the sabbath of the Lord thy God, in it thou shalt not do any work." The only exceptions to this rule are those made by our Saviour; works of necessity or of mercy. We have no right to labor at our ordinary vocation, whether it employ our physical or intellectual faculties, nor to travel on this day. It is set apart by God, for himself.

2. It forbids the labor of servants and children, in a word, of all those committed to our charge. The precept includes our sons and daughters, and our servants as well as ourselves. They stand in the same relations to God as ourselves; and we have no right to appropriate that time which he has already appropriated to himself. And still more, he who is at the head of a family is bound to see

that all under his charge refrain from labor, and sanctify the day.

3. The command of God forbids us to employ in labor on that day brute animals. They are as much entitled to rest as ourselves.

4. The command is to rest. Hence it as much forbids the employment of our time in the pursuit of pleasure as of wealth. It is as much a profanation of the sabbath to spend it in visiting, journeying, riding, sailing, or in any form of amusement, as in labor.

On the contrary, the precept for the observance of the sabbath enjoins the keeping of the day holy, that is, the sanctifying it, or setting it apart for a religious purpose. To rest from labor is commanded, but this is not all; we are to occupy it in the services of religion. Among these are :

1. Reading the Scriptures, meditation and prayer in private.

2. The special instruction in religion of the young, and those committed to our care. Hence we are bound to make such arrangements in our families as are consistent with this duty.

3. Social worship. This, under the Mosaic and Christian dispensation, has always formed an important part of the duties of this day.

The sabbath is one seventh part of time, that is, a whole day. Hence, the whole of it

is to be consecrated to the service of God. To employ any part of it in labor or amusement, or in trifling or secular conversation, or reading, is a violation of the command of God. It does not begin and end with the ringing of the bell for church, but it includes the whole day.

Again. It is set apart for the whole race, that is, for all men. Statesmen and legislators are under as great obligations to keep it as private citizens; the rich and powerful as much as the poor and dependent. Nor are any so insignificant as to be excused from the obligation. The child is commanded to keep the day holy as much as his parent, and he sins against God as much by playing, as older persons do by labor, on God's holy day.

I would impress these remarks particularly upon the young. One of the first indications that a young person is becoming vicious is his disrespect of the sabbath and his neglect of religious worship. The youthful sabbath-breaker rarely fails to become a profligate and abandoned man. Let a young person, therefore, under all circumstances, keep the sabbath day holy, and let him strenuously avoid the company of those who are inclined to violate it.

QUESTIONS.

1. What work may we do on the sabbath day?
2. Suppose we neglect a work of necessity on Saturday, may we do it on Sunday? Why?
3. Suppose I employ another to work for me on the sabbath, who is in fault, he or I?
4. Ought we to spend as much labor in cooking on the sabbath as on other days? Why?
5. For what purposes may we use animals on the sabbath day?
6. Animals cannot be religious; why then should they rest on the sabbath?
7. Why should we not amuse ourselves on the sabbath; since amusement is a sort of rest and refreshes the mind?
8. What is the great purpose for which God gave man the sabbath?
9. How should the duties of the sabbath be divided?
10. Ought young persons to keep the sabbath, as well as those who are older?
11. Is it right for young persons to play, to talk of their sports and to read trifling books, or to saunter about the fields on the sabbath? Why?
12. Why may we not do this when we are not in church, and when our parents do not see us?
13. Would it be right for legislators to meet, and make laws on the sabbath day?
14. Suppose one of your companions was in the habit of spending his sabbath in amusement, what opinion would you form of him, if he had had an opportunity to know better?
15. Did you ever know a good boy or girl who was in the habit of breaking the sabbath?

16. Explain how you ought to keep the sabbath, beginning at the morning and going on through the day.



HAVING considered the duties of man to God, we next proceed to treat of the duties of man to his fellow-man. These may be considered under two heads. 1. The duties of reciprocity. 2. The duties of benevolence. Hence this portion of the subject will be divided into two parts.

LOVE TO MAN, OR MORALITY.



CHAPTER I.

THE DUTIES OF RECIPROCITY.

THIS duty may be illustrated by several considerations.

1. When we look upon the gifts of God to men, and to nations, we observe a very striking diversity in the means of happiness which he has bestowed. One man possesses greater strength than another, a second is distinguished for personal appearance, a third for taste, a fourth for imagination, a fifth for wealth, and thus indefinitely. In this respect, therefore, men are, in the most striking degree, unequal.

But in another respect they are all equal, God having bestowed these gifts upon each

one, severally, as he will; and has given to every one the right to derive from them all the happiness in his power, provided he do not so use them as to interfere with the happiness of his neighbor. In this respect, therefore, that is, in the right to use for his own happiness, without injury to his neighbor, whatever God has given to him, all men stand on the ground of perfect equality.

The case may be illustrated by a familiar instance. Suppose that a wise and indulgent parent, having remarked the separate dispositions of his children, bestows upon them various possessions, according to their individual habits and character. To one he gives houses, to another land, to another money, and to another education. His intention manifestly is, that each one should derive all the happiness he can from that particular portion which he has received. But this diversity of gifts confers on no one the right of infringing upon the possessions or the means of happiness of his brother. And specially, if the father had given to one more than to another, this inequality would present no reason why he who was most favored should, by oppression and extortion, make the inequality greater.

Now the law of reciprocity teaches us to observe this distinction in all our dealings

with our fellow-men. It enjoins that as we all claim the right to enjoy without molestation the means of happiness which God has bestowed upon *us*, we leave every one else to enjoy without molestation the means of happiness which God has bestowed upon *him*. We claim the right to use our senses, our limbs, our intellect, our possessions, our reputation, as we will, if we do not molest any one else; and we are bound to leave every one else undisturbed in the exercise of the same right. If we act otherwise, if, to promote our own happiness, we infringe upon the right which God has given to our neighbor to promote his own happiness, we violate the law of reciprocity.

This duty in the Scriptures is enforced by the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Our Lord, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, teaches us what is meant by the words "our neighbor." It is the stranger, the alien, the national enemy, that is, every man whatever, under what circumstances soever he may be placed.

But what is meant by "loving our neighbor as ourselves"? Let us ask, how do we love ourselves? We answer, every one loves to enjoy without molestation the means of happiness which God has conferred upon him;

and he is painfully conscious of injury if this right be interfered with. In this manner he loves himself. Now, in the same manner he is bound to love his neighbor. That is, he is bound to have the same desire that his neighbor should enjoy unmolested the gifts of God's providence, as he has to enjoy them himself; and to feel the same pain, when another man's rights are invaded, as he does when his own are invaded. With such sentiments, he would be just as unwilling to violate the rights of another as to suffer a violation of his own rights. He would love his neighbor's rights as he loves his own; that is, he would love his neighbor as he loves himself.

The same precept is expressed in other places, in another form: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them; for this is the law and the prophets. Matt. vii. 12. That is to say, would we wish to know how delicate is the respect which we should entertain towards the rights of others, we may always decide it by asking how delicate is the respect which we would desire others to entertain towards our rights. But this precept, I think, goes a single step further. It obliges every man to *commence* such a course of conduct, without regard to the conduct of others to him. If we complain that

another has violated the claim of reciprocity towards us, it commands us, before we urge our claim for redress, to act upon the principle of reciprocity towards him. Every one must see that if this command were obeyed, retaliation would instantly cease, and that by leaving all the injuries at the door of one party, and placing before that party the constant example of justice, it would deprive him of the shadow of apology. Thus, the tendency of such conduct would be to banish crime and violence from the earth.

From what we have said, it is evident that this precept is of universal application. It binds all men, and under all circumstances. It applies to the strong and to the weak, the rich and the poor, the young and the old. The richer the benefits which God has bestowed upon us, the greater is the reason why we should be satisfied with our lot, and strive to be the means of benefiting others. If God has been bountiful to us, this surely is no reason why we should deprive another, with whom God has dealt less liberally, of the slender pittance which has been conferred upon him. And this applies to children as well as to men. The boy who takes from his playfellow a hoop or a kite, because he is stronger, or cheats him out of it, because he is older and more saga-

cious, just as much violates this law, as the man who robs a house, or steals a horse.

And the precept applies to nations as well as to individuals; that is, it is given to man, as man, under what circumstances soever he may be placed. Nations are bound to love the rights of other nations as they love their own; and to require of others nothing more than they actually exemplify in their own conduct to them. It is a much greater wrong for nations to oppress, to lie, and to cheat, than for individuals to do the same wickedness, because it inflicts injury, and corrupts the moral sentiments of men, to a much wider extent. And, for such wrong, both rulers and people will be held answerable at the bar of God.

And, lastly. Inasmuch as we are all the creatures of God, and are all equally under his protection, he who violates the law of reciprocity, not only does wrong to man, but sins against God. We are bound to do justice to our neighbor, not only because he is our neighbor, but also because he is a creature of God; and because God has commanded us to do it. No act of injustice, therefore, whether in young persons or old, in individuals or nations, is a trifling offence, inasmuch as it is a violation of our obligations to our Maker, and he will assuredly requite it, either in this world or in the next.

QUESTIONS.

1. Give examples, from cases which you know, of the difference in the gifts of God to different persons.

2. Does this difference give to one a right to interfere with the gifts which God has bestowed upon another? Illustrate this. Give examples.

3. Illustrate this by such examples as these. Suppose one man had a larger farm than another, or was stronger than another, or one boy had a larger kite than another.

4. Who is our Father, and who gives us all things, as he pleases? What conclusion should we draw from this?

5. Illustrate, in your own language, what you mean by the law of reciprocity. Show, by examples, how you would act if you obeyed it, and how you would act if you disobeyed it.

6. Repeat, in your own language, the parable of the Good Samaritan.

7. When we consider the question to which the parable was an answer, and the command of Christ at the close, what do we suppose that Christ meant to teach us by it?

8. Give an example of loving your neighbor as yourself.

9. Illustrate, by example, what you understand by the precept, As ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.

10. Suppose another person has treated you unkindly, how ought you to treat him when you ask him to make reparation?

11. You feel that it is wrong for another person to treat you ill; what does this feeling teach you in respect to your treatment to him?

12. If God has given you greater strength, or wealth, or knowledge than another person, what right does this give you over that other person?

13. What obligation does it impose upon you towards him?

14. We are much stronger and wiser than the Indian tribes on our frontier. Does this give us any right to interfere with the means of happiness which God has given to them? Why?

15. Suppose we violate the duty of reciprocity, is this a sin against God? Why? Explain this in your own language.

CHAPTER II.

OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND THE MODE IN WHICH IT MAY BE VIOLATED.

I HAVE said that every man has an equal right to use whatever means of happiness God has bestowed upon him, in such a manner as he pleases, provided he do not so use it as to molest his neighbor. Among these gifts are our limbs and faculties, our intellect and our conscience. That is, we all have a right to use the various powers of our bodies, our minds and our conscience, in such manner as we please, provided we do not interfere with the right which every other man has to use his means of happiness in the same manner. Every man has a right so to use his eyes, his

hands, and his feet, as will promote his own happiness, if he will leave others unmolested. Every one has a right to study what he please, and to make known what he believes to be truth, to those who are willing to hear it ; and to worship God in such a manner as he believes will be acceptable to him, provided only he does this without interfering with the rights of his neighbor.

The only apparent exceptions to this are such as spring from the relation of parent and child.

1. A parent is under obligation to support a child and is responsible for his actions. He must therefore have a right to control his actions. He is responsible to God for the intellectual and moral education of the child, and therefore he has a right to direct what his child shall read, and what religious instruction he shall receive.

2. A parent has a right to the services of his child until he becomes of age, and is able to provide for himself. This right he may, as in the case of apprenticeship, transfer to another. But, as his own right is limited by age, he can transfer it for no longer time than he could enforce it himself. This right of the parent over the child, however, ceases when the child becomes of age ; and after that, the

parties stand, so far as natural right is concerned, upon the same level with other men.

The right of personal liberty may be violated, 1. By the individual ; and 2. By society.

SECTION I.

THE VIOLATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY BY THE INDIVIDUAL.

The most common form of this violation is in the case of domestic slavery.

Domestic slavery proceeds upon the belief that A, by the payment of money to B, may obtain a right to use C as his property. It supposes that one man has no right to use his limbs, his intellect, and his other powers, for the promotion of his own happiness ; but only in such a manner as will promote the happiness of another. And it supposes a man to have this right, not over a single individual only, but over as many as he can obtain by purchase.

It is manifest that slavery involves the right over the intellect and conscience, for if it exist, it must involve everything necessary to its existence and perpetuity. And that such control is supposed necessary is evident from the fact that in all cases of apprehended insurrection the master has always assumed it, and has claimed the right to do so.

The precepts of the Gospel seem equally,

with those of natural religion, at variance with the existence of slavery.

The precept of the Christian religion is, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. The meaning of this precept we have before shown. Now this must be absolutely prohibitory of slavery, unless it can be shown that any man is not my neighbor. Every one must admit that were this precept universally obeyed, slavery could not exist for a moment, in fact, though it might exist for a while, in form.

Again. Every one sees that slavery of white men is at variance with the precepts of religion. We all thus judge respecting the slavery formerly existing in the Barbary States. But does difference of color make any change in moral right and moral obligation?

If it be said that the Old Testament recognized slavery, we answer, this was an era of comparative moral darkness, to which, under the clearer light of the Gospel, we need not go for illumination. It also allowed of divorce, which the New Testament forbids.

If it be said that the New Testament does not forbid it, we answer, the first precept of the New Testament is such that, if it were obeyed, slavery could not exist. It is unjust to say that it does not *forbid* it, because it does not take that particular mode of *extirpating* it which we might select.

While, however, such is the law of Nature and Revelation, it is proper that we should declare what seems to be the duty of men to each other, supposing this relation to have become established.

1. It is the duty of every man to recognize the right of every other man to all the blessings which God has given to both. Hence, if the slave be able to take care of himself, it is the duty of the master at once to put an end to a relation which can be continued no longer without injustice; the master will either immediately manumit him, or, by allowing him such wages as are just, enable him, in process of time, to liberate himself.

If the slave be not able to take care of himself, then it will be the duty of the master to elevate his character, and improve his understanding, so that he shall become so. As soon as this is accomplished, the duty of the master is the same as in the preceding case.

On the other hand, the duty of the slave is submission and obedience in all cases in which this obedience is not at variance with the command of God. The fact that the master exercises an unlawful authority does not give to the slave the liberty of resort to force. And slaves are commanded to do this on the ground that this meekness and forbearance

and submission under injury is well pleasing unto God, who will render unto every man according to his deeds.

QUESTIONS.

1. Suppose a man should imprison another in his house, in what manner would he violate the laws of reciprocity?
2. Suppose he would not let him go off from his farm, what violation would this be?
3. How does the institution of slavery violate the right of personal liberty?
4. Could slavery exist, if equal right over their bodies and minds were allowed to all men?
5. Could slavery exist, if every one understood and loved the rights of his neighbor as he does his own?
6. Would it be right for us to enslave men of our own color?
7. Does difference of color make any difference of right?
8. Suppose slavery was allowed under the Old Testament, does it render it lawful for us? Why?
9. Suppose you were a master, and were convinced that it was contrary to the law of God to hold a slave, what ought you to do?
10. Suppose the slave was so ignorant, and unaccustomed to care, that he could not, if free, support himself, what ought you then to do?
11. Suppose you thus held him for his own good, and for the purpose of fulfilling the law of reciprocity, would you be guilty of the wrong of slavery? Why?
12. Suppose you were a slave, what would be your duty to your master and to God?

SECTION II.

VIOLATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY BY SOCIETY.

By a society is meant a number of individuals associated together, and agreeing to be governed by certain laws. Thus a family is society governed by the laws enacted by the parents. Thus men form societies among themselves, such as philosophical or benevolent societies, for the purpose of accomplishing certain objects. Thus nations are also societies, composed of individuals, united under certain laws, for the purpose of accomplishing other objects.

I have before stated that God has committed to every individual such means of happiness as he has pleased, and has given to all men an equal right to employ those means as they choose, provided they do not employ them to the molestation of their neighbors. So long as they employ them innocently, therefore, they are not responsible to any one; and, if any one interfere with the innocent employment of them, it is tyranny or oppression.

But it is evident that a society may thus interfere as well as an individual. Thus a whole family, as well as any one member,

may turn against a single individual, and agree to oppress him. So, also, a nation, which is a larger society, may agree together to injure a single individual or several individuals; that is, they may make laws which shall interfere with the innocent pursuit of his or their happiness, and thus be guilty of oppression.

When men unite together in a nation, they appoint certain persons to make and to execute laws, who are called the government of that nation. These persons are Legislators, and the assembly, when convened, is called Parliament, Congress, or a Legislature, and those who execute the laws are called Judges, etc. Hence, oppression is generally executed by governments, though, in fact, it can never be executed but with the consent of the people. Sometimes, however, the people are guilty of oppression, even in opposition to the government; this is the case when mobs assemble to injure and molest individuals; and it is one of the most odious and detestable forms of oppression and tyranny.

I. Societies interfere with the personal liberty of individuals in several cases.

1. When an individual is imprisoned without crime, or reasonable suspicion of crime.

2. Whenever, although he may be possibly

guilty of crime, he is punished without a fair and impartial trial. Until a crime is proved there is against a man nothing but suspicion. And, if it be allowed to punish men on suspicion, the innocent are as likely to suffer as the guilty ; that is, there is an end of justice.

3. When a man is forbidden to go where he pleases, and employ himself as he pleases, provided he do it to the injury of no one. This is the case when a man is forbidden to leave a country, or to set up his trade in a particular district. All these violations of liberty occur in many of the nations of Europe and Asia.

II. Society may interfere with the *intellectual* liberty of man.

1. When a man is forbidden to study anything that he chooses. Thus, in some countries, a man is forbidden to study the Bible and many other instructive books.

2. When a man is forbidden to publish his opinions on any subject not interfering with the rights of others. This was the case when Galileo was forbidden to publish his opinions respecting astronomy ; and wherever men are forbidden to circulate the Scriptures and religious books.

When, however, men publish works which tend to excite the wicked passions of men,

and lead them to violence, or when they publish what will injure the reputation of their neighbors, it is the duty of society to interfere and punish the guilty. This, however, is only to be done after a fair and impartial trial, to which a man, in this case, as in any other, is fully entitled.

III. Society may interfere with the *religious* liberty of the individual. As the cultivation of his moral nature is one means of happiness, every man is at liberty to cultivate it in any manner that he chooses, without injury to his neighbor. Society violates this right,

1. When the exercise of any mode of worshipping God, which does not molest other men, is forbidden.

2. When any mode of worship is commanded, because that which is thus commanded may seem to those on whom it is imposed contrary to their obligations to God.

3. By inflicting punishments on men, or depriving them of any of their rights, because they profess one religion in preference to another.

4. By any method in which religious men are deprived of any facilities for the prosecution of their happiness in this way, which are granted to other men for prosecuting it in any other way. If the whole subject of religion

is a matter between a man and his God, society has no right to interfere with it unless a man so perform what he considers to be his duties to God as to interfere with his duties to man. And, in this case, the interference is not on the ground that the thing in question is a good or bad religion, but on the ground that there is a violation of the rights of man.

Religious liberty is violated in those countries where only a particular form of religion is allowed; and also where a particular form is established by law, and the professors of every other are deprived, for this cause, of many of their just rights.

QUESTIONS.

1. Suppose you wished to form a society, how would you do it?

2. Suppose one hundred men were cast away on a desolate island, and wished to form a government, how would they proceed?

3. What general principles should they adopt as the foundation of all their laws?

4. Can people, as well as governments, be guilty of oppression? Give an example.

5. In some countries, kings, when displeased with any of their people, have ordered them to be imprisoned for life. Was this right? Why?

6. Suppose a man was suspected of murder, but there was no proof against him, would it be right to imprison him or punish him? Why?

7. In some countries men are forbidden to go to any other country, though they might greatly benefit their condition by so doing. Is this right? Why?

8. Why should not governments direct what books the people shall read?

9. Peter and John were beaten by the Jews, for declaring that Jesus was the Messiah. Why was this wrong?

10. Suppose a man should publish a book persuading all men to rob and murder their neighbors. Ought this to be allowed? Why?

11. Suppose there should be a number of Mahomedans in the United States; would it be right to let them build a mosque, and publish the Koran, and celebrate their false worship?

12. Ought not all men to worship God? Ought we not then to oblige them to worship God? If our way of worship is right, ought we not to make them worship him in our way?

13. In some countries men are deprived of the right of holding office, unless they worship God in one way. Is this right? Why?

14. Legislatures have sometimes attempted to forbid men from giving away property to religious objects. Is this right? Why?

15. Is it right to banish men for their religious opinions? Why?

CHAPTER III.

OF PROPERTY.

SECTION I.

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY.

THE right of property is the right to use something as I choose, provided I do not so use it as to interfere with the rights of my neighbor. Thus, if a man own a horse, he has a right to use it in his own labor as he will, and no one, except in case of excessive cruelty, has a right to interfere. But a man has no right to use his horse to eat up his neighbor's oats; and it would be no excuse for his conduct for him to plead that the horse was his own, and he had a right to use him as he pleased.

We proceed to consider the modes in which the right of property may be acquired.

These are either *direct* or *indirect*.

First. *Direct*.

1. By the immediate gift of God.

When God has given me a desire for any object, and has placed the object before me, and there is no rational creature to contest my claim, I may take it, and use it as I will, subject only to the limitation of my obligations to him and to my fellow-creatures. On this

principle is founded my right to enter upon wild and unappropriated lands, to hunt wild game, to pluck wild fruit, to take fish in rivers, or in the ocean, or anything of this sort.

2. By the labor of my own hands.

If I own a piece of land, and by the labor of my hands raise an ear of corn, that ear of corn is mine, as much as the labor by which it was produced. If, however, another own the farm, and I labor upon it, I am entitled only to the portion which has been agreed upon between us. He is entitled to his share for the use of the farm, and I to my share, as the reward of my labor. This is the nature of wages.

Second. *Indirect.*

1. By exchange.

If I own anything, I have the right innocently to use it as I will; and of course, if I see fit, to part with it for something else. As my neighbor has the same right, we may mutually exchange the ownership of particular articles with each other. When such an exchange is made by the respective owners, property is held rightfully.

2. By gift.

As I may rightfully part with, and another rightfully receive, my property for an equivalent rendered; so I may, if I choose, part

with it without an equivalent; that is, in obedience to my feelings of benevolence, affection, or gratitude. This also confers a valid title to property.

3. By will.

As I have the right to dispose of my property during my lifetime, or may exchange or give it away as I see fit, previous to my decease; so I may give it to another on condition that he shall not enter upon possession until after my death.

4. By inheritance.

As men frequently die intestate, that is, without having made a will, society presumes upon the manner in which they would wish their property to be disposed of. Thus, it is supposed that a husband and a parent would wish his property to be distributed among his wife and children; or, if a man have neither wife nor children, among his nearest relations. On such principles, therefore, the laws respecting inheritance are formed. This also gives a valid right to property.

5. By possession.

If a man hold property without any valid title, yet, if no one can show any better title, we are bound to leave him unmolested. This is evident, for he who takes it away, with no better title, would be liable to be immediately

dispossessed by another, and thus contentions would arise without end, and continue forever, all without any beneficial result.

To sum up what has been said in a few words. The right of property may be *originally acquired*, either by the gift of God, or by the labor of our hands. It may be *subsequently acquired*, either by exchange, by gift, by will, or by inheritance under law. But in all cases of transfer of ownership, the *consent of the original owner*, either expressed or interpreted by society, is necessary to render the transfer morally right. And lastly, although the individual may not have acquired a valid title to property, yet mere possession is a sufficient bar to molestation, unless some claimant can prefer a better title.

QUESTIONS.

1. By what right would you kill and eat a deer in a forest, or a buffalo on a prairie?
2. By what right would you take possession of and cultivate an island which you discovered?
3. By what right do you hold, as your property, the cattle which you have reared?
4. Explain the right of property acquired by exchange, and give an example.
5. Why should men have a right to direct what shall be done with their property after they are dead?
6. Suppose a man has gained possession of a house to which he has no right, but of which I do not know

who is the real owner; have I any right to turn him out? Why?

7. Enumerate and give examples of the various modes by which property may be rightfully acquired.

8. Ennmerate the articles which you possess, and explain the right by which you hold them.

SECTION II.

OF THE MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED.

The right of property, as we have said, is the right to use something as we will, provided we do not use it to the molestation of our neighbor. This right is exclusive. Provided a man uses his property within these limits, no one whatever has a right to interfere with him. And the right also covers *all* his possessions. No one has any more right to take a part, though ever so small, than to take the whole. It is just as much a violation of the right of property to take an apple, as to take a horse; to take what belongs to the public, as that which belongs to the individual.

Again, we have said that no transfer of property is valid, without the *voluntary consent* of the owner. And this consent is not available of right, if it be influenced by motives presented *wrongfully* by the receiver. If I threaten a man with death, if he does not give

me money, he may choose to give me the money rather than be shot; but this does not render the transfer just. If I make a false representation to a man, and thus influence him, the injustice is the same. In the one case it is robbery, in the other case it is swindling. And thus in general every transfer of property is morally wrong, when the consent of the owner is obtained by means of a vicious act on the part of him who receives it.

Hence the right of property may be violated,

1. By taking property without knowledge of the owner, or *theft*. It does not vary the nature of the transaction, to say that the owner "does not care about it," or that "he will never miss it," or "would have no objection." The simple question is, has he *consented* to the transfer? If he have not, the action is theft.

2. By taking the property of another by consent violently obtained, or robbery.

Here we wickedly obtain power over a man's person, and then offer him the choice of death or injury, or the surrender of his property. As this is an aggravated violation of right, and also always endangers life, it is punished with the utmost severity, being in most countries made a capital offence.

3. By consent fraudulently obtained, or cheating.

This may be of two kinds. 1. When no equivalent is offered, as when a beggar obtains money on false pretences.

2. Where the equivalent offered is different from what it purports to be; or when consent is obtained by a fraudulent act on the part of him who obtains it.

As this case includes by far the greatest number of violations of the law of property, and as it is that from which most of the others proceed, it will be treated of at considerable length.

We shall divide the subject into three parts.

1. When the equivalent is material, and the transfer perpetual.

2. When the equivalent is material, and the transfer is for a limited time.

3. When the equivalent is immaterial.

QUESTIONS.

1. If you own anything, how much of it do you own?

2. If you own anything, how much of it may any one take without your consent?

3. How much may you take from another person without his consent?

4. Suppose there was a pile of wood belonging to the town; would there be any difference between taking some of *it*, and taking wood from an individual?

5. Suppose I oblige a man to give me money by a threat; what is the nature of the crime?

6. Suppose I obtain money from another, by telling a lie; what crimes do I commit?

7. Suppose you were passing by an orchard, and took some apples; would it be any excuse to say that the owner would never know it? Who would know it?

8. Have you any objection to another person's taking from you what is yours?

9. Have you any right to say that another person will have no objection to your taking what is his?

10. Suppose an older brother should take, by force, an apple from a younger brother; what would this act be?

11. Suppose one boy should run away with another boy's kite, what would this be?

12. Suppose a girl should take a needle from the needle-case of another, without the other's knowing it; what would this be?

13. Suppose a man should beg money for medicine for his family, saying they were sick when they were not; what would this be?

14. Suppose you sold a knife for a good one, which you knew would break the first time it was used; what would this be?

SECTION III.

THE LAW OF PROPERTY, WHEN THE EQUIVALENT IS MATERIAL, AND THE TRANSFER PERPETUAL, OR THE LAW OF BUYER AND SELLER.

The nature of the law in this case may be seen from considering the relative situation of the parties to each other. He who wants a pound of tea, or a yard of calico, could not go

to China for the one, nor to the manufacturer for the other. It is therefore for his interest to pay a person to keep these things on hand for him, that he may buy them whenever, and in what quantities soever, he may want. This the merchant undertakes to do for him; and therefore he acquaints himself with the qualities of the goods, and employs his time and money in buying them and keeping them for sale. This is a mutual advantage to both parties. The merchant is bound to exert his best skill and talent for the good of the customer, and the customer is bound to allow him a fair remuneration for his time, skill and expenses.

Hence, 1. The merchant is under obligation to furnish goods of the same quality as that ordinarily furnished at the same prices. He is paid for his skill in purchasing, and if he do not possess that skill, the fault is his own, and he ought to suffer the consequences.

If he have purchased a bad article, and has been deceived, he has no right to sell it at the market price, on the ground that he gave as much for it as he would have done if it had been good. If he had purchased an article very cheap, he would have been entitled to the benefit of his skill; and if his skill be deficient he must abide the consequences, by selling, not according to what it *cost*, but according to what it is *worth*.

The only exception to this rule, is where it is known that the purchaser buys at his own risk; as when a horse is sold at auction, and nothing is said about it. It is then understood that every one examines and decides for himself, and bids accordingly.

2. The merchant is not only *bound* to sell, but is at liberty to sell, at the market price. That he is *bound* to sell thus, it is evident from the fact that he endeavors to persuade every one that he does so. That he is at *liberty* to do this, is evident from the fact that if his goods fall in price on his hands, he must sell at the same price as others, or else no one will purchase of him. If, then, he must suffer in case of a fall of price, he may charge proportionably, with a rise of price. If I have given five dollars a barrel for flour, and flour falls to four dollars, I must sell for four. If it rise to seven, I may charge seven, without regard to what it cost me.

3. The seller, however, has no right to influence the judgment of the buyer by any motives aside from those derived from the real value of the article in question.

He has no right to appeal to the fears, or hopes, or avarice of the buyer. He has no right to spread false reports, concerning the plenty or scarcity of the article in question;

nor to purchase it in large quantities for the sake of creating an artificial scarcity. He has no right to take advantage of the youth, inexperience, or vanity of the buyer; and stimulate him to make large purchases, or at great prices, or to practise the arts which are frequently resorted to, by those who are commonly called good salesmen.

4. These remarks apply with just the same force to the buyer. Both parties are under equal and corresponding obligations. The buyer is bound to allow to the seller a fair remuneration for his labor, time, interest and risk. He is also forbidden to attempt to influence the mind of the seller by false information, or by any of those artifices by which men frequently underrate the value of what they wish to purchase. “’Tis naught, ’tis naught, saith the buyer, but when he goeth his way, then he boasteth.”

It is vain to reply to these remarks, that if men acted thus, their families could not be supported. It is better to be poor than to act dishonestly, and disobey God. Besides, is it not evident, that two parties acting on these principles would both succeed better than by endeavoring to cheat each other? And again, if a man attempt to cheat me, that is a reason why I should not traffic with him; it is no reason why I should try to cheat him.

5. A bargain is concluded, when the parties have signified to each other their will to make the transfer. Henceforth, all the risk of loss and the chance of gain are mutually transferred; although the articles themselves have never been removed. Hence, if an article become injured after the sale, and before the delivery, the purchaser bears the loss, unless the delivery were one of the conditions of sale; and then all loss, previous to actual delivery, is borne by the seller. If I buy a load of coal on the wharf, and the wharf be washed away, the loss is mine. If I buy a load of coal and pay for the delivery at my house, and the cart break down, and the coal be lost, the loss falls upon the seller.

6. The buyer is bound to inform the seller of any uncommon rise in the value of his goods. If he buys without so doing, it is fraud. If the property of my neighbor rise in value by the providence of God, while it is in his possession, the *advantage* as justly belongs to him, as the *property* itself. I have no more right to deprive him of the one than of the other.

These principles are, it is to be feared, too commonly lost sight of in the transaction of business. They are violated when men sell goods of a different character from that which the name of the goods imports; as when wines

are weakened and adulterated ; when ordinary weight or measure is curtailed ; or when a different fabric from that ordinarily understood by the name is substituted, as when cotton and linen is sold for linen cloth. It is in vain to palliate these wrongs by telling of their universality, as though universal wickedness could render vice, virtue. The law of God is, "Thou shalt not covet," and it matters not, who, or how many, disobey it, God will judge *every man* according to his works.

QUESTIONS.

1. Suppose you were to open a store, what is justly expected of you?
2. What good does a merchant do in community? Explain in your own language.
3. What do you give for marbles? What would they cost, if you had to go to Holland for them?
4. What do you give for needles? What would they cost, if you had to go to England for them?
5. Suppose you had purchased a piece of cloth and found it was damaged ; have you any right to sell it for good cloth? Why?
6. Suppose you have purchased it at an auction for damaged, and it proves to be good ; are you obliged to sell it for damaged? Why?
7. Suppose a man comes into your store to buy, and does not know anything about the price of goods ; may you ask him whatever you please? Why?
8. Suppose a man came to your store to buy, would you have a right to induce him to believe the article

was very scarce, to make him buy more, when such was not the case?

9. Suppose I write to a merchant to send me a load of corn from Richmond, and the vessel is cast away, who bears the loss? Suppose he offers to deliver it for such a price, and I pay it, who bears it then? Why is this?

10. Suppose I hear of the declaration of war, and know that flour is worth twice its previous value; have I a right to buy of one who has not heard the news, at the former price?

11. Would men grow rich, faster or slower, if they all obeyed the rules of strict justice?

SECTION IV.

OF TEMPORARY TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY, OR LOANS.

A man frequently wishes for the use of the property of another for a specified time. He is then under an obligation to pay a reasonable price for this temporary possession. The amount paid for the use of money is called *interest*. What is paid for the use of other property, is called *rent*, or *hire*.

The principles by which this remuneration is fixed are the following: the borrower pays, 1st, for the use, and 2d, for the risk.

1. *The use*. Some property is more useful, that is, is capable of yielding a larger profit than other property. One farm will yield a larger crop than another. And the same

property may be worth more at some times than at others. When there are many persons desirous of hiring farms, the rent of a farm will justly be higher than when many farms are unoccupied and no one wishes to hire.

2. *For the risk.* When an owner parts with his property, in some cases it is much more certain that he shall receive it back uninjured than in others. The risk in loaning a farm is less than in loaning a ship. The risk of loaning a house is less than in loaning a horse. As this risk is greater or less, the remuneration is justly increased or diminished. Hence the price of a loan is always to be adjusted in view of these two circumstances.

Loans are of two kinds. 1st, loans of money, and 2d, loans of other property.

The loan of money. 1. The lender is bound to demand no more than a fair remuneration for the use of his capital, and for the risk to which it is exposed.

2. He is bound to make use of no unlawful means to influence the decision of the borrower. The principles here are the same as those which govern the permanent exchange of property.

3. The borrower is bound to pay a just equivalent, as I have stated above; and he is

equally forbidden to use any dishonest motives to influence the decision of the lender.

4. Inasmuch as the risk of the property is one part of the consideration for which the owner receives remuneration, the borrower has no right to expose the property of another to any risk not contemplated in the contract.

Hence, he has no right to invest it in a more hazardous trade, nor has he a right to employ it in a more hazardous speculation; and if he does he is using it in a manner for which he has paid no equivalent. He is also under obligation to take all the care to avoid losses, which he would take if the property were his own, and to use the same skill to conduct his affairs successfully.

5. He is also bound to repay the loan exactly, according to the terms specified in the contract. This requires that he pay the *full sum* promised, and that he pay it precisely at *the time* promised. A failure, in either case, is a breach of the contract.

The question is often asked, whether a debtor is morally liberated by an act of insolvency. I think not, if he ever afterwards have the means of payment. It may be said, this is oppressive to debtors, but we ask, is not the contrary principle oppressive to creditors, and are not the *rights* of one party just as valuable and just as much *rights* as those of the other?

OF THE LOAN OF OTHER PROPERTY.

The principles which apply in this case are very similar to those which have been already stated.

1. The lender is bound to furnish an article, which, so far as he knows, is adapted to the purposes of the borrower. That is, if the thing borrowed has any internal defect, he is bound to reveal it. If I loan a horse to a man who wishes to ride forty miles to-day, while I know that the animal is able to go but thirty, it is a fraud. If I let to a man a house which I know to be in the neighborhood of a nuisance, or to be in part uninhabitable, from smoky chimneys, and do not inform him, it is fraud. The loss in the value of the property is mine, and I have no right to transfer it to another.

2. So the lender has a right to charge the market price arising from the considerations of use, risk, and variation in supply and demand. This depends upon the same principles as those already explained.

3. The borrower is bound to take the same care of the property of another as he would take of his own, to put it to no risk different from that specified or understood in the contract, and to pay the price upon the principle stated above. Neither party has any right to

influence the other by any motives extraneous to the simple business of the transfer.

4. The borrower is bound to return the property loaned precisely according to the contract. This includes time and condition. He must return it at *the time* specified, and *in the condition* in which he received it, ordinary wear and tear, only excepted. If I hire a house for a year, and so damage its paper and paint that before it can be let again it will cost half the price of the rent to put it in repair, it is a gross fraud. It is just as immoral as to pay the whole and then pick the owner's pocket of the half of what he had received.

The important question arises here, if a loss happen while the property is in the hands of the borrower, on whom it shall fall. The principle I suppose to be this.

1. If it happen while the property is subject to the use specified in the contract, the owner bears it, because it is to be supposed that he fore-saw the risk, and received remuneration for it.

2. If the loss happen in consequence of any use not contemplated in the contract, then the borrower suffers it. If a horse die while I am using it carefully, and for the purpose specified, the owner suffers. If it die by careless driving, I suffer the loss. He is bound to furnish a good horse, and I a competent driver.

3. The same principle governs, if a *gain* arise unexpectedly. If this gain was one which was contemplated in the contract, it belongs to the borrower. If not, he has no equitable claim to it. If I hire a farm, I am entitled, without any additional charge for rent, to all the advantages arising from the rise in the price of wheat, or from my own skill in agriculture. But if a mine of coal be discovered on the farm, I have no right to the benefit of working it, for I did not hire the farm for this purpose.

OF INSURANCE.

There is always a liability that property may be lost, as by fire, or by storm and tempest. This liability is called risk. When one man insures for another, he agrees for a given sum to bear this risk. Thus my house is liable to take fire. My neighbor says, if you will give me twenty dollars a year I will pay you the value of your house if it burns down. Or, if I am going to send a ship to China, or anywhere else, I pay a certain sum to the insurer, and he agrees to pay me for the ship if it be cast away or lost. This is called insurance. When men unite together to insure houses or vessels, this is called an insurance company. He who insures another's property is called an underwriter.

The rule in this case is simple. The insured is bound fully to reveal to the insurer every circumstance within his knowledge, which could in any measure affect the value of the risk; that is to say, the property must be, so far as he knows, what it purports to be, and the risks none other than such as he reveals them. If he expose the property to other risks, the insurance is void, and the underwriter, if the property is lost, refuses to remunerate him; and if it be safe, he returns the premium. If the loss occur within the terms of the policy, the insurer is bound fully and faithfully to make remuneration precisely according to the terms of the contract.

As to the rate of insurance very little need be said. It varies with every risk, and is made up of so many conflicting circumstances, that it must be agreed upon by the parties themselves.

QUESTIONS.

1. Illustrate, in your own language, what you mean by interest. Give an example.
2. Show by an example, first, what you mean by paying for *use*, and, second, what you mean by paying for *risk*.
3. Suppose you had two houses, and you rented one for a dwelling-house, and the other for a house to keep gunpowder in; for which would you charge the greatest rent? Why?

4. Suppose a man was very much in need of money, why might you not charge him twice as much as another man, under the same circumstances?

5. Why might I not circulate a report of the declaration of war, in order to raise the interest of money, so that I might in a given case get more for it?

6. Suppose I borrow money to build a house, at a given rate of interest, the house being the lender's security; why might I not build a *ship* with it?

7. Suppose I borrow money of a man, and promise to pay him to-morrow. If I pay him on the next day, is this strictly honest?

8. If I owe money, and the laws do not oblige me to pay it, am I, or am I not, bound to pay it notwithstanding?

9. Suppose I loan to a customer a chaise, which is likely to break down on his journey; is this honest? Why?

10. Suppose I hire a horse, and drive him so carelessly that he is fairly liable to injury; is this honest? Why?

11. Are people generally as careful of hired property as they are of their own? Is this honest?

12. Suppose I hire a horse to go five miles, and drive him ten, and he is injured; who bears the loss?

13. Suppose I hire a horse to drive in a chaise, and I use him in a plough, and he is injured; who bears the loss?

14. If I hire a house for a year, and a new street is opened, which renders it of twice the value, before the close of the year, am I obliged to pay more rent?

15. Suppose you wanted to have your house insured, what would you do?

16. Suppose you knew your house was likely to be struck with lightning, ought you to mention it when you make application for insurance?

17. After it is insured, if you were to be careless about fire, would it be right? Why?

SECTION V.

OF EXCHANGES WHEN THE EQUIVALENT IS IMMATERIAL.

The case to be considered here is that of master and servant.

One man frequently needs the services of another. Sometimes he needs assistance in performing the labors of the family; at others he needs workmen to perform the labor of his trade, or occupation. Here a given kind of labor is to be done, and for this labor he proposes to give an equivalent. The exchange agreed upon is, a given amount of service, on the one hand, and a given amount of money, on the other. There is dishonesty, if either party either demand an equivalent from the other, or if, after the equivalent has been agreed upon, he do not fulfil his engagement.

1. The master is bound to allow to the servant a fair remuneration for his labor. As, however, this would vary so much in different instances, it is generally agreed upon beforehand, by the parties. In this case, as in every other case of barter, both parties are forbidden to take advantage of the hopes or fears of each other; or to accomplish the ex-

change by means of any influence unduly exerted.

Whatever the master has agreed to pay, he is bound to pay fully and punctually. There can be no more aggravated case of injustice than to delay payment to the poor and laborious, because they have not the means of enforcing payment by law, or by the excitation of public opinion.

Thus saith the Scriptures, “the hire of your laborers, who have reaped your fields, that is *kept back* by fraud, crieth; and the cry is come into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.”

And, lastly, the master is bound to require of the servant no more service than that which is, by both parties, understood in the agreement; and is bound to have respect to the bodily health and moral wants of those under his charge. It is wicked to urge human beings to labor beyond their power of physical ability, or to such an extent as to deprive them of the means of intellectual and religious improvement. Yet it is to be remarked, that when such engagements are made, they as frequently proceed from the avarice of the employer as of the employee. The blame, in this case, is to be shared between them.

2. On the other hand, the servant is bound to perform the service which he agreed to

render, according to the spirit of the agreement. If he employ that time which he has agreed to spend for the benefit of another, in idleness, in useless conversation, or in anything else than the duty required, he is guilty of dishonesty, as much as if he stole. It is as fraudulent for him to receive money for what he has not done, as for the master to keep back the money which the other has fairly earned.

And, again, as the master employs, not only the body, but the mind and intelligence of the servant, the servant is bound to use his best discretion to promote the interest of his master. If, for the want of this, the property of his employer be injured, it is injured in violation of the contract, and the servant ought to bear the loss.

Such are the principles which should regulate the fulfilment of contracts of this sort, so far as simple equity is concerned. The benevolence of the gospel would, however, teach us something more. It would teach both parties to regard each other as placed in a situation in which a special opportunity is offered for rendering good offices, and manifesting kindness. This would lead the master to render the condition of the servant as happy as it was in his power, without regard to the mere articles of the agreement; and the ser-

want to watch over the interests committed to his charge, with a care which could not be specified in the terms of any contract. Thus, there would be on both sides the constant reciprocation of gratuitous kindness and good will; by which the character of both would be elevated, and the happiness of both greatly promoted.

There exists in this country a very useless dislike to the terms of master and servant. Every one who hires the services of another is, in so far, a master; and every one whose services are hired is, in so far, a servant. Every one is therefore, in various respects, both master and servant. If I employ a man to make a pair of shoes he is my servant; if he employ me to teach his son I am his servant. Why then should the terms which designate this relation be odious? The honor is not in being either master or servant, but in performing the duties of either relation well; and the dishonor belongs to neither, but to the neglect of the duties which the nature of the station imposes.

QUESTIONS.

1. Why does every man need servants, at some time or other?
2. What principle should govern both parties, in making an agreement?

3. Ought we to be *more* or to be *less* careful, in fulfilling our engagements with the poor, than with the rich? Why?

4. Suppose an employer engages a man to labor for him eighteen hours a day, and the man insists upon being so employed; who is to blame?

5. Suppose a workman labors but six hours a day; has he a right to demand as much as if he labored ten hours?

6. Suppose you were employed by the day, and were sent on an errand, and you stopped on the corner of every street to talk over the news; would this be honest? Why?

7. What would your services be worth, if you spent all your time thus?

8. Suppose you were employed to make a table, and by carelessness and negligence spoiled it; who ought to bear the loss?

9. Ought any principles to influence us, in the relation of master and servant, besides the terms of the contract?

10. Is there anything honorable in being a master, or dishonorable in being a servant?

11. For what cause ought we to respect men?



CHAPTER IV.

OF CHARACTER.

WHEN we are asked what is the character of another we give our opinion of his present state, as it regards mind, acquisitions, capacities, moral principles, and moral habits.

This we call the character of the man. We say that he has such or such a talent, such or such principles, and such or such defects or excellences.

Now, it is manifest that a good character is the most valuable of all our possessions. It is the source of all our present happiness; and the only ground of reasonable hope for our happiness in the future.

Hence, reason would teach us that the greatest benefit which we could confer upon another would be to *improve* his character, that is, to render him better; and the greatest injury which we could inflict upon him would be to injure his character, that is, to make him worse.

The law of reciprocity forbids us on any pretence, or in any manner, to injure the character of another, that is, to make him worse.

The most solemn threatenings in the Scriptures are uttered against those who shall be the means of corrupting others. "Whosoever shall break the least of these commandments, and *shall teach men so*, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven." In the Old Testament, Jeroboam is mentioned as atrociously wicked, because "*he made Israel to sin.*" Where God is represented as executing his fiercest displeasure upon Babylon, it is because

she “ did *corrupt the earth* with her wickedness.” The woe denounced against the Pharisees, in the time of our Lord, is “ because ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte; and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves.”

We may injure the character of others in several ways.

1. By weakening their moral restraints. Religious principle is the greatest restraint upon vice. He who does anything to diminish the power of religious motives, by speaking lightly of religion, by profanity, or sabbath breaking, by ridiculing the Scriptures, or their doctrines, or by encouraging disobedience to parents, is guilty of this crime.

2. By exciting the wicked passions of men. He is guilty of this crime, who publishes or circulates wicked books or pictures, or who, by wicked conversation, fills the mind with wicked thoughts. The same is true of him who teases others, and excites their anger, or provokes them to malice and revenge; for, in this manner, we render others bad tempered and vicious.

3. Another mode in which we are guilty of this crime is by ministering to the wicked appetites of men. Those are thus guilty, who teach others to drink spirituous liquors, or

entice them to drink, or set drink before them. It is melancholy to pass through the streets of a large city, and observe how many persons are obtaining their livelihood by pampering the appetites of the young, and cultivating those habits which must lead, in the end, to profligacy and vice.

We are then always to remember that no words or actions, or conduct or writing, or occupation can be innocent, of which the natural tendency is to render others worse, that is, to injure their moral character.

QUESTIONS.

1. Explain, in your own language, what you mean by the character of a man.

2. What is the benefit of a good character? What the evil of a bad character?

3. What influence can we exert on the character of others? Explain how.

4. What influence *ought* we to exert upon the character of others? Give an example.

5. Does God hold us accountable for the influence which we exert on the character of others?

6. Suppose a boy should persuade another to break the sabbath; of what crimes would he be guilty?

7. Suppose a boy should teach another to speak disrespectfully of his parents; of what crimes would he be guilty?

8. Suppose a boy should teach another to swear; of what crimes would he be guilty?

9. Suppose a boy should tease and plague another, so

as to make him angry; of what crime would he be guilty?

10. Suppose you should make a child drunk, to have some fun with him; of what crime would you be guilty?

11. Suppose you, by example or conversation, lead any one to do wrong; of what crime are you guilty?

12. How do we know that God will punish such conduct most severely?

13. If we find that our companions wish to persuade us to do wrong, what ought we to do?

14. Who are our worst enemies?



CHAPTER V.

OF REPUTATION.

WE have, in the preceding chapters, spoken of character. It is obvious that character, of what sort soever it be, produces, as a natural result, a certain general opinion respecting us among men. Thus, if a man always tells the truth, men will form the opinion of him that he will tell the truth; that is, he will have a reputation for veracity. If he be always honest, men will have a corresponding opinion of him; that is, he will have a reputation for integrity, and so of any other case.

Now this estimation in which a man is held is a very valuable possession. The prospects of every man depend upon his reputation.

Who will give employment to another if he has the reputation of being a liar and a thief? And hence to injure the reputation of another is to inflict upon him the greatest injustice, and to do him the most irreparable harm. We have no more right to take away the estimation in which a man is held, than to take away his money. Nor have we a right to do this, even if he have more estimation than he deserves. Suppose a man have come by his money dishonestly, this gives us no right to pick his pockets, or to interfere with him in any way, unless we are authorized by law to do so. So, we have no right to diminish the reputation of another, even if it be more than he deserves, unless there be a definite and just cause for so doing.

The precepts of the Bible on this subject are such as these: "Judge not, that ye be not judged; for with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, and considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

"Let all bitterness and wrath and clamor and *evil speaking* be put away from you."

"Speak evil of *no man*." "Speak not evil one of another."

"He that will love life and see good days, let him keep his tongue from evil."

We shall proceed to consider, first, the cases in which we are forbidden, and, second, those in which we are not forbidden to utter injurious truth. I do not consider the cases in which we utter injurious falsehood, because here, the crime of lying, which will be treated of in another place, is added to that of slander.

1. We are forbidden to give publicity to the *bad actions* of men, without adequate cause. We always do this without adequate cause, when we tell of the evil deeds of others *without any cause*, or for the sake of gratifying *idle curiosity*, or from *love of talking*, or from *envy*, or *malice*, or *revenge*.

2. We are forbidden to utter general conclusions respecting the characters of men, founded on particular bad actions which they may be known to have committed. Who would wish his whole reputation to be decided by a single action? A single illiberal act no more proves a man to be covetous, than a single charitable act proves him to be benevolent. How unjust, therefore, to proclaim a man destitute of *all virtue* on account of one failure in virtue!

3. We are forbidden to judge, that is, to assign unnecessarily bad motives to the actions of men. I say *unnecessarily* bad motives, for some actions are such, that to presume a

good motive is impossible. Yet, even here, it is safe simply to state the fact, when it is necessary to state it, and leave every one to judge of the motive for himself.

This rule would teach us, first, to presume no unworthy motive where the action is susceptible of an innocent one; and secondly, never to ascribe to an action which we confess to be good, any other motive than that from which it professes to proceed. The reasonableness of this is obvious if we apply it to our own case. Is there any other rule by which we would wish our own actions to be estimated?

4. We are forbidden to lessen the estimation in which others are held, by mimicry, ridicule, calling of names, giving opprobrious epithets, or any other means by which they are brought into contempt. It is no excuse to say *we do not mean* any harm. We know that it *does harm*, and this is enough to render us guilty. Both old and young persons would converse very differently, if they were to remember the saying of Scripture, by thy *words* thou shalt be justified, and by thy *words* shalt thou be condemned; and that for every *idle word* that men speak, they shall give an account at the day of judgment. It is well said by Bishop Wilson, "We should never hear with pleasure, and never repeat, such

things as may dishonor God, hurt our own character, or injure our neighbor.”

We come next to speak of the cases in which we are not forbidden to speak injurious truth of our neighbor. These are,

1. To promote the ends of public justice. He who conceals a crime against society renders himself a party to the offence. We are bound, here, to speak of it to the proper civil officer, in order that the offender may be brought to trial and punishment.

2. To protect the innocent. When we know of certain facts in a man's history, which, if known to a third person, would protect the latter from important injury, it is our duty to put such a person on his guard. What is required here is, that I assert what I *know* to be the fact, and *this only*; and that I do it *for the purpose* specified.

3. For the good of the offender himself. When we know of the evil actions of another, and there is some other person, as for instance, a parent or guardian, who is ignorant of them, but who might by control or advice be the means of reforming the offender, it is our duty always to give the necessary information. This is the greatest kindness that can be shown to both parties, and it is a kindness, for the want of which, multitudes of children are

ruined. There can be no greater act of friendship, and none for which a parent should be more grateful, than for that confidence which would put him in possession of any knowledge of this sort, which could be of advantage to his child.

4. Though we may not be at liberty to make public the evil actions of others, we are under no obligations to act towards the offender as though he were innocent. If the providence of God have put this knowledge in our possession, we are at liberty to use it each one for himself. We may and ought to shun the company of a wicked man, although we are the only persons who know of his crime.

QUESTIONS.

1. What is the difference between character and reputation? Give an example.

2. Give an example, to show the value of a good reputation, and the injury of a bad one.

3. Explain, in your own language, why a man's reputation is as much his own, as his property.

4. Why should not two persons sit down together, and talk over all the evil they know of respecting their neighbors?

5. Suppose I know a man in a single instance to have been in a passion; have I right to conclude that he is passionate? Why?

6. Have I a right to publish that he is a passionate man? Have I a right to deny him any other good quality, supposing he be really passionate?

7. Suppose I know a man to be liberal; have I a right to say that he does it from ostentation?

8. Suppose a man refuses me charity; have I right to say that he does it from covetousness? Why?

9. What harm is there in mimicking and making sport of others, whether present or absent?

10. Suppose I know that a man has stolen a horse; have I a right to keep it a secret?

11. Suppose I know a man to violate any important law of society; am I obliged to keep it a secret?

12. If I speak of it at all, to whom am I bound to tell it?

13. Suppose I know a man to be dishonest, and could prove it, and he were about to form a copartnership with a friend of mine, whom I knew he would cheat, if he could; what would be by duty in such a case?

14. Suppose I told the facts to my friend, ought I to tell them to everybody?

15. What would distinguish such a case from slander?

16. Suppose I knew a child to swear, or lie, or steal, or use bad language; would it be slander for me to inform his parents of his conduct, if I supposed they did not know of it?

17. Would it be proper for me to spread it about, and tell other persons of it?

18. When we make known the evil actions of others, what is the motive which must govern us, in order to render our conduct innocent?

19. If we know a person to be wicked, though we may not talk about it, is there anything else we are bound to do?

CHAPTER VI.

OF VERACITY.

VERACITY consists in telling the truth, with the intention to do so.

Telling the truth may have respect to something which we assert to have been done, or to be now doing; as when we assert that it rained yesterday, or that it rains now; or it may have respect to something which we declare we intend to do; as when we promise that we will give a person a dollar to-morrow.

The intention is always to be taken into view when we speak of the moral guilt or innocence of an assertion. If a person honestly means to tell the truth, he is innocent of the crime of lying, though he may be in error. If he mean to deceive, he is guilty, even although what he utters may be in fact true.

Veracity will therefore be considered under two heads. 1. Assertions. 2. Promises.

SECTION I.

OF ASSERTIONS.

The law of veracity requires in this respect, that when we make an assertion respecting any fact we convey to another person precisely

the idea which exists in our own minds; in other words, that we state the fact just as we believe it to have existed.

The Scripture precepts on this subject are such as the following:

Ex. xx. 16. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.

Prov. vi. 16. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord.

Ps. xxxiv. 13. Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile.

John viii. 44. Those that speak lies are called "children of the devil;" that is, followers, or imitators of the actions of the devil.

Rev. xxi. 8. All liars shall have their portion in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone.

27. There shall in no wise enter therein (into heaven) anything that maketh a lie.

As illustrations of the indignation of God against the sin of lying, see the case of Gehazi. 2 Kings, v. 20—7. And of Ananias and Sapphira. Acts v.

The law of veracity forbids, therefore,

1. The utterance as truths of what we know to be false. This is always the case when we speak under any circumstances with the intention to deceive.

2. Uttering as truth what we *do not know*

to be true. When we utter anything as truth which we do not know to be true, we do not convey to another the impression which exists in our mind ; that is, we speak falsely. It is a foolish subterfuge to say, we did not know *but what it was true* ; if this was all we knew about it, we should have said so, and not convey to another exactly the contrary impression.

But, it will be said, are we never to utter anything but what we *know* to be true ; are we never to give an opinion ? Doubtless we may ; but then it must be given as an opinion, and not as the truth.

3. Uttering what may be true, but uttering it in such a manner, or under such circumstances, as shall convey a false impression to others.

We may do this in several ways ; as, for instance,

1. By exaggerating some of the circumstances.

2. By extenuating some of the circumstances.

3. By exaggerating some of the circumstances, and extenuating others.

4. By stating the facts as they existed, but combining them in such a manner as to leave a false impression upon the hearer. If I say, A entered B's room, and immediately after he left it, B discovered that a watch had been

stolen, I naturally leave the impression that A was the thief. If I say this with the intention of producing a false impression, though I do not assert anything but the fact, I am guilty of falsehood.

As the crime of falsehood consists in making intentionally a false impression upon another, we may incur as much guilt by the tones of the voice, look of the eye, a motion of the head, or a gesture of the body, as by words. If a traveller ask me which road leads to Boston, and I point to him in the wrong direction, it is as much a lie as though I conveyed the same impression by words.

6. This law applies to our intercourse with men under all the relations of life. It forbids parents to lie to children, and children to lie to parents, instructors to pupils, and pupils to instructors, the old to the young, and the young to each other, buyers to sellers, and sellers to buyers, politicians to their own party, and to the opposite party; in a word, the obligation is universal and cannot be set aside by any, either of the natural or artificial relations in which men may stand to each other.

It is no excuse for falsehood to say that the person to whom we were speaking has no right to know the truth. This is a reason why we should not tell *the truth*, but it is no reason

why we should *tell a falsehood*. If a man has no just claim upon us, this is a reason why we should not pay his demand, it is no reason at all why we should cheat him.

The importance of cultivating a strict regard for truth is absolutely incalculable. Hence the evil of speaking falsely in jest, or of exaggerating the facts of a story, for the sake of amusement or effect. He who allows himself to lie in jest, will soon find himself lying in earnest, and will in the end probably become an habitual liar. Let every one, therefore, in the most trivial cases, observe the most strict and scrupulous veracity, and he will find that by the cultivation of no one virtue he will gain more moral power over himself, or gain more control over the actions of others.

If such be the fact, we see how wicked it must be to teach others to lie. This is sometimes done by parents and nurses, who tell stories to frighten children, for the sake of accomplishing some momentary purpose. It is also done by those who direct their children or servants to tell their visitors that they are not at home, when they are at home, but do not wish to be interrupted. The case is the same, when merchants direct their clerks to assure a customer that their goods were bought for one price, when they were bought for another.

How can such persons answer to God for the ruin which they are preparing for those committed to their charge? And how can they expect that the truth will be told to them by those whom they have deliberately taught to lie?

QUESTIONS.

1. Give an example of what you mean by telling the truth.
2. Give an example of a person's telling what was not true, and yet not be guilty of lying.
3. Give an example of a person's telling what was true, and yet be guilty of lying.
4. Why should veracity be divided into assertions and promises?
5. How shall we know, when we make an assertion, that we are innocent of the guilt of lying?
6. Repeat the case of Gehazi in your own language.
7. Repeat the case of Ananias and Sapphira.
8. What do we learn from these cases?
9. Can we intentionally deceive another without being guilty of falsehood?
10. Why is it falsehood to tell a thing, of which we do not know but it is true? Give an example of this form of falsehood.
11. Give an example of a falsehood by exaggeration.
12. Give an example of a falsehood by extenuation.
13. Give an example of both of these combined.
14. Give an example of facts, told as they existed, but so combined that they produce the impression of a falsehood.
15. Give an example of a lie where not a word is spoken.

16. Suppose several boys in a school should agree to lie to an instructor; would this be as wicked as for the instructor to lie to his pupils?

17. Does it make a lie any better, for several persons to agree together to tell it?

18. Does a lie become less guilty because people get in the habit of lying?

19. Is it any harm to lie in jest? What is the consequence of so doing?

20. Suppose any person should command you to tell a lie; ought you to do it?

21. Suppose any person should command you to tell a lie, and you should do it; would the command of another excuse you in the sight of God?

SECTION II.

OF PROMISES AND CONTRACTS.

1. Of promises.

A promise is the expression of our intention, in such a manner as voluntarily to create an expectation on the part of another.

The law of veracity demands that we express the intention exactly as it exists in our own minds. We either in fact have the intention, or we have it not; and we are no more at liberty to lie about this fact than about any other.

Having expressed this intention in such manner as to create an expectation on the part of another, we are under obligation to fulfil it.

In other words, a promise is binding, in the sense in which the promiser knows that the promisee receives it; that is, we are bound to fulfil the expectations which we have voluntarily created.

Promises are not binding, therefore, in the way that the *promiser* means them to be received, for he might mean one thing and say another; nor in the way that the *promisee* understands them, for then there would be no limit to the extravagant expectations of men. The obligation consists in having voluntarily created expectation, and by this expectation it is that we are bound.

Hence, as in the case of assertions, we may promise by actions, or gestures, or looks, as much as by words. He who, at an auction, nods to an auctioneer, when that nod is understood to signify a bid, is as much bound as though he made a bid by words. The case is the same when in any other way, or by any course of action, we voluntarily excite expectation.

It may be proper here, however, to mention a few of the cases in which promises are not binding.

1. When the performance is *impossible*. We cannot be under obligation to do what turns out to be absolutely out of our power. If,

however, we know of this impossibility beforehand, we are guilty of lying and fraud, and are bound to make good the disappointment to the other party.

2. When the performance is *unlawful*. We cannot be under obligation to do what we are also under a contrary obligation to leave undone. If, however, we know or might have known of the unlawfulness before the promise, and the other party did not know it, we are guilty of deception, and are bound to make good the disappointment. When the other party knew of the unlawfulness of the act, we are not thus bound. If I agree to unite with another person in a robbery, I am bound to break my promise, but surely I am under no obligations to pay him the amount of what he might have gained by the crime.

3. Promises are not binding when no expectation is *voluntarily* excited. If A inform B that he shall give a horse to C, not intending that B shall communicate it, and if B communicate it without A's knowledge, A is not bound. If A *desire* B to inform C of it, he is as much bound as though he communicated it himself.

4. Promises are not binding when they are known by both parties to *proceed upon a condition* which subsequently *turns out to be false*. If I promise a beggar money on the ground of

his story, which turns out to be a fabrication, I am not bound by such promise.

These are the principal cases in which promises are not binding. The inconvenience which may result from fulfilling a promise is not a release. No man ever need promise unless he please, but having once promised, he is bound, unless he be morally liberated, until the promise is fulfilled. Hence we should be extremely cautious in making promises, and we should never make them without allowing ourselves sufficient opportunity for reflection. And I believe it will generally be found that those who are most careful in promising, are most conscientious in performing their promises.

II. Of contracts.

A contract is a mutual promise; that is, we promise to do one thing on the condition that another party does something else.

The rules for the interpretation of a contract, the reasons for its obligatoriness, and the cases of exception, are the same as those of promises; the only difference is, that in this case there is a specific condition annexed, by which the obligations of the parties are limited and defined.

Hence, after a contract is made, so long as the other party performs his part, we are under obligation to perform our part. But if either party fail, the other is, by the failure of a con-

dition necessary to the contract, liberated. And still more, the party which fails, is ordinarily under obligation to make good the damages which may have been suffered by his failure.

This is the general rule. There is, however, an exception, which it is important to notice. There are some contracts entered into, in which the terms of the engagement are fixed by the law of our Creator. Such, for instance, are the contracts of marriage, and that of civil society. In such cases either party is not liberated by every failure of the other party, but only for such cause as God has specified.

It is proper to remark that the obligation to veracity is the same, whether the engagement be entered into between individuals or societies. The latter are as much obliged to fulfil their promises as the former. A civilized people are as much bound by their treaties with an uncivilized as with a civilized people, or as much as an individual is bound by his contract with an individual. Every other course of conduct, under what pretences soever it may be disguised, or by what power soever upheld, is as mean and contemptible, as it is shameless and wicked.

QUESTIONS.

1. Give an example of a promise, and explain what it contains.

2. What do you mean, by being bound to fulfil a promise?

3. A general, besieging a city, promised the garrison that, if they would surrender, no blood should be shed. They surrendered, and he buried them all alive. Did he keep his promise? Why?

4. Herod promised the daughter of Herodias that he would give her whatsoever she would ask. Was he bound by his promise to give her the head of John the Baptist? Why?

5. Suppose I ask a boy who took another boy's knife, whether he did it, and he shakes his head in such a way that he means me to understand by it that he did not; is this a lie? Why?

6. Suppose I promise to visit a man, and before the time come have the misfortune to break my leg; am I guilty of falsehood for not going? Why?

7. I have mentioned above the case of Herod. Suppose that he had actually promised to Herodias the head of John the Baptist; would he have been bound to fulfil that promise?

8. Suppose several persons combine to do an unlawful act; are they any more under obligation to do it than if they had not combined? Why?

9. If a man told you, without leave, that your father was going to give you a dollar, would your father be obliged to do it?

10. If a physician has promised to visit a patient, would he be released from his promise by a storm, or by friends calling to see him? Why?

11. Who are most likely to break their promises?
12. Give an instance of a contract.
13. Suppose I promise to take you to ride, if you are ready at twelve o'clock to-morrow; if you are not ready till a quarter after twelve, am I bound by my contract?
14. Suppose the United States should make two treaties, one with the Indians, and the other with Great Britain; which would be the most obligatory?
15. Suppose I make two contracts, one with my neighbor, and the other with the government; which is the most obligatory?



CHAPTER VII.

THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF PARENTS.

THE design of the parental relation may easily be seen from a few obvious facts.

1. The child comes into the world entirely unprepared for the duties which it must in subsequent life discharge. It must, in a few years, support itself; it needs therefore physical strength, but it is now helpless; it is surrounded with blessings which can be obtained only by intelligence, but it is now ignorant; it will be encompassed by temptations, which can only be resisted by moral culture, but its moral principles are, as yet, unformed. To illustrate all this by a single case. Take any of the arts or professions, and consider how would an

infant of a week or of a year old discharge it, or how he could support himself from starvation by the exercise of it.

It is manifest, then, that the child needs sustenance during infancy, and a process of cultivation by which he may be trained for the duties of subsequent life. We have all enjoyed this support and cultivation, or we should not now be alive. It is our duty to exercise the same care over those that come after us.

Now the condition of the parent and child is adapted to precisely this state of things. The parent has strength, wisdom, experience, and a disposition to use these for the welfare, especially for the education of the child, and the child is weak, ignorant, inexperienced, and disposed by nature to rely on and to confide in the direction of the parent.

Hence the duties of the parent may be mainly comprehended under the single word education ; and his rights extend to everything which is in any manner necessary to the discharge of this duty.

The duties of parents include the following particulars :

1. Support and maintenance. The parent is under obligation to feed and clothe his child, until, in the station of life which he fills, he is able, with suitable diligence, to support himself.

As to the expensiveness of this support, the parent must be the judge. It is unwise for a parent to maintain his children in habits of expense either above or much below his own circumstances. The parent is also the natural protector of his child; he is bound to guard him from harm, and shield him from oppression and abuse.

2. Physical education. Few are aware, until too late, of the importance of a healthy and vigorous bodily constitution. Such a constitution can only be secured by exercise, temperance, and care in youth. It is the duty of the parent to pursue such a course of physical education as shall develop all the physical powers of the child; to inure it to hardship and render it patient of labor. The watchfulness necessary to this will rarely be exercised by any other person than a parent.

3. Intellectual education. How greatly the happiness of an intellectual being depends upon mental education it is needless to observe. And that the foundation of all such education must be laid in youth is evident, since, when this season is past, the time of the individual is required to provide for his own support.

Under this head I would remark that the parent is under obligation :

1. So far as it is in his power to give a child

such an education as is suited to his peculiar bias and capabilities.

2. To select such instructors as will best accomplish this result.

3. To see that the instructor does his duty; and to encourage the child by manifesting such an interest in his studies as will stimulate him to all suitable effort.

4. And if such be the duty of the parent, he is under obligation to *take time to do it*. He should remember that *every man has time to do his duty*. And he has no right to devote to business or to amusement those hours which God has set apart for the discharge of his duty as a parent.

And here let me remark that a strange parsimony prevails among parents on this subject. They will deny themselves to *accumulate property* for their children, and at the same time will grudge a trifling expenditure for the sake of obtaining for them that education without which their possessions will be a very doubtful blessing. It seems by many persons to be taken for granted that all places of education are equally good, and that the only question to be decided is, which is the cheapest. And by a mere question of dollars, and frequently by that of cents, the intellectual cultivation and habits of the child are decided.

4. Moral education.

The moral character of *the man*, and, of course, the eternal destiny of the individual, must depend, in no small degree, upon the moral training of *the child*. This moral training, both by precept and example, it must receive at the hands of its parent. For the manner in which it is discharged God holds the parent accountable. It is therefore his duty :

1. To teach the child his duties to God and to man, and to produce in its mind a permanent conviction of its moral responsibility. Specially is this to be done by instilling into the mind of the child the principles, precepts and motives of the Holy Scriptures.

2. To eradicate, so far as possible, the vicious propensities of the child. He should watch the first appearances of pride, obstinacy, malice, envy, revenge, cruelty, anger, lying, and their kindred vices, and strive to extirpate them before they have gained firmness by age, or vigor by indulgence.

3. To set before the child such an example as will tend to render his instructions in the highest degree available. He whose example contradicts his precept must expect his children to neglect the precept and follow the example.

4. Inasmuch as all our efforts in this as in every other case will be fruitless without the

blessing of God, a parent is under obligation to do all this in prayerful dependence on the divine assistance. He should pray with and pray for his children.

5. As the character of the child depends greatly on his associations, the parent is bound to watch over these with unceasing care. He should suffer a child to form no intimacies, and place him in no situations, by which his moral character will be endangered.

6. As the parent sustains to all his children the same relation, he is bound to conduct towards them all with the strictest justice and impartiality.

II. The rights of parents.

The rights of parents are commensurate with their duties. As they are responsible for the physical, intellectual, and moral education of their children, so they have over them all the right of physical, intellectual, and moral government necessary for the discharge of this responsibility.

The parent has of course a right to direct the expenses and the physical habits of his child ; the place and manner of his education, the kind of moral education which he shall receive ; the associations which he shall form ; and he has the right to use all reasonable means for producing in the child obedience to his will. He

is under obligation to use this power for the good of the child, according to the best of his judgment and ability. But, if he errs, there is no redress, as his authority is ultimate so long as it exists.

These duties and rights, however, are not perpetual.

The child becomes, in process of time, able to maintain itself, to direct its own mental pursuits, and to decide for itself on its moral duties and obligations. Whenever this takes place in fact, the relation of parent and child ceases, so far as the responsibility of the parent is concerned. This time is fixed by law, at the period when the child becomes of age, or is twenty-one years old. It may, however, in fact arrive before, or be delayed after this time.

The authority of instructors is an authority delegated by the parent, to whom, and not to the child, the instructor is responsible. Hence the relation between the parties is essentially that of parent and child. The instructor is the superior and the pupil is the inferior. The duties of the instructor are limited by the terms which he and the parent have mutually agreed upon. His rights are always commensurate with his duties; that is, he is invested with power to accomplish the purpose which has been committed to him. Within this limit

he has the right to command, and it is the duty of the pupil to obey.

QUESTIONS.

1. Explain, in your own language, why it is that a child needs the care and attention of a parent.

2. Explain the circumstances which render a parent precisely adapted to supply the wants of the child.

3. Explain, from these two considerations, what is, in general, the duty of a parent.

4. Suppose children are abused, ought they to fight and quarrel? What ought they to do if they need protection?

5. Would it be kind in a parent to let a child grow up in idleness; to eat and drink what he pleased, and as much as he pleased, and never teach him to do anything by which to support himself? What would be the result of so doing?

6. Would it be kind in a parent to let a child go to school or not, and study or not, just as he pleased? Why?

7. What should we think of children who are displeased when their parents require them to take exercise and to labor and study?

8. Has a parent a right to know how his child behaves, and whether he is diligent and studious or not?

9. Suppose an instructor should conceal such information from a parent; what ought we to think of him?

10. Which is of the most value, a good education, or a large fortune? Why?

11. Would it be right for a parent to allow his child to grow up without any knowledge of his duties to God? Why?

12. When the parents converse with them on these

subjects, children frequently feel restless and displeased. What should we think of such children?

13. Would it be kind in a parent to allow a child to grow up with a broken arm, and never try to have it healed?

14. Which is the greatest calamity, a broken arm, or a vicious and malicious temper, or the habit of lying and stealing? Why?

15. Would it be kind for a parent to allow his child to go among children who had some infectious disease? Why?

16. Which is worse, to take an infectious disease, or to learn bad and wicked habits?

17. If parents are under obligation to God to take such care of their children, and if they have such a right over them, what is the duty of children?

18. Suppose a child thinks that his parent is too strict; is this any reason why he should not obey him? Why?

19. Suppose parents and children differ on these subjects; who is most likely to be correct; and which has the right to govern?

20. Suppose one brother was twenty years old, and another only three years old; which would know best about what was suitable for the younger?

21. Explain the nature of the authority of the instructor over the pupil.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.

THE duties of children may be comprised under the following particulars.

1. *Obedience.* By this I mean that the child

is under obligation to conform to the will of the parent *because it is his will*; aside from the consideration that what is required may seem to the child wisest or best. The only limitation here is that of conscience. A child must obey God rather than his parent. Even here, however, he has no right to resist. He must obey God and suffer meekly the consequences.

2. Children are bound to *reverence*, or, as the Scriptures express it, to *honor* their parents. By reverence I mean that conduct and those feelings which are due from an inferior to a superior. The child is bound to show respect and honor to his parents, such as he would show to no other persons. Nor is there in this anything degrading, but everything honorable. There is nothing more seemly, more ennobling, and more dignified, than profound filial respect. Napoleon, at the summit of his power, never appeared so truly exalted as in the deference which he paid to his mother. The same principles would teach us universal respect for old age.

3. *Filial affection*, or the affection due from a child to its parents, *because they are his parents*. A parent may be entitled to our love because he is a man, or because he is a good man, but beside all this he is entitled to our special affection because he is a parent. This imposes

upon us the duty of always speaking of them with respect, seeking their happiness by all the means in our power, and of performing all this from love to them because they are our parents. This love will render such services not a burden, but a pleasure, under what circumstances soever it may be in our power to render them.

4. It is the duty of the child whenever it is, by the providence of God, rendered necessary, to *support its parents in old age*. That man is guilty of monstrous ingratitude, who would not cheerfully deny himself of luxuries or conveniences, in order to minister to the wants of his aged and needy parents.

Nor is this merely confined to necessary support. Where parents are not indigent there are various acts of kindness and attention and remembrance, which it is in the power of the child to perform, which may add greatly to their happiness, and soften the asperities of advancing old age. These opportunities for the manifestation of filial affection will be gladly sought for by a thoughtful, benevolent and obedient child.

The precepts of the holy Scriptures in regard to this duty are frequent and impressive. I subjoin a few as examples.

Ex. xx. 12. Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land

which the Lord thy God giveth thee. This, as the Apostle Paul remarks, Eph. vi. 2, 3, is the only commandment in the decalogue to which a special promise is annexed.

Prov. i. 8, 9. My son, keep the instruction of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother. They shall be an ornament of grace (that is, a graceful ornament) unto thy head, and chains about thy neck.

Prov. xiii. 1. A wise son heareth his father's instructions, but a scorner heareth not rebuke.

Eph. vi. 1. Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right.

Col. iii. 20. Children, obey your parents *in all things*, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord.

The displeasure of God is frequently denounced against those who violate his command.

Deut. xxvii. 16. Cursed be he that setteth light by his father or his mother; and all the people shall say, Amen.

Prov. xv. 5. *A fool* despiseth his father's instructions.

Prov. xxx. 17. The eye that mocketh at his father and despiseth to obey his mother; the ravens of the valley shall pluck it out, and the young eagles shall eat it. That is, he shall perish by a violent death; he shall come to a miserable end.

From such passages as these we learn :

1. That the holy Scriptures inculcate obedience to parents as a religious duty ; and that he who violates it is guilty of sin against God as well as against man. The Scriptures mention disobedience to parents as one of the offences for which God is most justly offended with men.

2. That obedience to parents is no proof of meanness and servility, but that it is every way honorable and delightful. It is a *graceful ornament* ; that is, it confers additional beauty on what was before lovely.

3. That the violation of this command exposes the transgressor to especial and peculiar judgments. And the experience of all ages has borne witness to the fact that disobedience to parents in youth is the common precursor to disgrace and misfortune in manhood and old age.

The child has a right to expect that the parent will discharge to it the duties of which I have spoken in the preceding chapter, and that he will exercise his authority for its good to the best of his knowledge. If, however, he should fail, this is no excuse for filial disobedience. The duties of the child to love and reverence and honor its parent remain as before, since they are unchangeably appointed by God.

OF THE DURATION OF THESE RIGHTS AND
DUTIES.

The child is under obligation to yield implicit obedience to the parent so long as he is in a state of pupillage; that is, so long as the parent is responsible for his conduct, and the child is dependent on his parent. When the child assumes the responsibility of the care of himself, the obligation of *obedience* ceases. But after this, a child can find no one whose advice will be so valuable, so disinterested, and generally so wise as his parents'.

The obligation to respect and affection continues through life, and rather increases than diminishes with advancing years. As the child grows older, he has it in his power to manifest more delicate respect, and more sympathizing affection; and as the parent grows older he feels more sensibly the need of attention, and finds his happiness to be more decidedly dependent upon it. This then is the time to exhibit our gratitude for the care which our parents have taken of us in our childhood and youth, and to manifest by our conduct our repentance for those acts of thoughtlessness and waywardness which formerly have grieved them.

I mentioned in the last chapter that the relation of the instructor to the pupil is essentially

parental. I here add, that the relation of the pupil to the instructor is essentially filial. That is, the pupil is bound to render obedience to his instructor on the same principles, and for the same reasons, as to his parent. It depends on the parent to decide how long this relation shall subsist, but so long as it subsists the duty of the pupil is obedience, respect and affection.

QUESTIONS.

1. Suppose a parent should tell you to go on an errand, and a stranger passing by should tell you not to go; which should you be under obligations to obey? Why?

2. Suppose *any one else* should tell you to do what your parent had forbidden; whom ought you to obey? Why?

3. Suppose your parent should command you to disobey God, what ought you to do?

4. Do you ever hear children speak disrespectfully of their parents? What command of God do they violate?

5. Suppose a child did what his parents commanded, but did not love them, nor really desire to please them; would this fulfil the command of God?

6. If children really love their parents, will it be a hardship to obey them?

7. Explain, in your own language, how we ought to treat our parents when they grow old.

8. Repeat, in your own language, what the holy Scriptures inculcate respecting the duties of children.

9. Suppose a child disobey his parents; how many sins does he commit? What are they?

10. Which do you think is most honorable,— to treat our parents disrespectfully or respectfully?

11. Which of the sons of David was very disobedient and cruel to his father?

12. How was he punished for it?

13. Do you remember a good man, who is spoken of in the Bible, who was punished for not bringing up his children well?

14. Suppose a child was so unfortunate as to have a parent who did not do right; what would be the duty of a child to such a parent?

15. Explain, in your own language, the manner in which you think pupils should behave to an instructor.

16. When you see pupils behave thus, how do you feel towards them? How do other people feel?

17. If children wish to be beloved and respected, how should they behave towards their parents and instructors?



CHAPTER IX.

DUTY OF CITIZENS.

SECTION I.

OF THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT.

SUPPOSE twenty men and women, with their families, to be thrown together upon an uninhabited island. They would soon begin, from necessity, to build themselves houses and cultivate the soil, and catch for their use whatever animals might be found. Whatever each family

thus builded, or raised, or caught, it would, of course, hold as its own. And if any one exchanged with another, whatever he had secured by exchange would also be his own. In other words, each one would work for himself, and claim as his own whatever he had produced.

They might thus live very happily for a long time,—at least, so long as every one acted in this manner—and they would need neither laws nor government. But suppose that any one should begin to act differently. Suppose any one should undertake to drive his neighbor's family out of their house, or, after they had raised a crop of corn, should come and carry it into his own barn, and leave them to starve. And suppose another, seeing this was so easy a way of support, should undertake to do the same thing to another neighbor. The result would be, that if no one could enjoy the fruit of his labor, no one would work, and they would either starve, or else they would go away and live alone, and thus be exposed to the inconveniences of always living in the wilderness.

Or suppose another case. Suppose that the man who was turned out of his house determined upon having his revenge, and therefore set fire to the house of his oppressor. Here would be two families turned out of their houses and left destitute. These two families might,

on the same principles, go on to turn out of their possessions two others, who might avenge themselves by two more fires, and thus it would go on, until all the houses and property were destroyed, and the whole settlement would very soon perish.

Now it is clear that this would never do. There must be a stop put to such proceedings, and the only way would be to stop it at the beginning. The whole community would have to unite against the first robber, and oblige him to return the property which he had stolen, and to agree together that they would always do so to any one who should steal again. And if this did not stop it, they would have to agree to punish the robber in some such way as would oblige him to let alone everything that was his neighbor's. This would be the *first law* of this little community.

And now having made this law, and thus having undertaken to see that no one interfered with his neighbor's property or rights, it is evident that no one need undertake to avenge himself, or to reclaim by force anything that had been taken from him. This community would therefore agree together that if any one was injured, he must apply to them for redress, instead of redressing himself. The reason of this is evident, for they would be better judges

how much he was injured, and what redress should be made, than he would be himself, because it is a bad rule to allow any man to be the judge in his own case. This would be the *second law* of this community.

These two laws then would be, first, *that no one should interfere with his neighbor's rights*, in any manner whatever; and secondly, if any one did thus interfere, that the *injured person should not attempt to redress himself, but should leave the subject to be decided upon by the whole community*.

In process of time these laws would have to be subdivided, as there would be various forms of injury. A man might encroach upon his neighbor's land. This would require one form of redress. One might steal by day, and another by night; one might break open a house, another might steal a horse; each one requiring a separate form of punishment. And so of redress of grievances; one might strike another, and a second might burn his house; these would have to be distinguished, and all these forms of crime be defined, so that the innocent might be distinguished from the guilty, and the guilty punished according to their deserts.

As this community increased in number, and it became necessary to make a great many laws,

it would be impossible for them all to meet on every occasion that presented itself. They would therefore be obliged to appoint a few persons in their place to meet for this purpose. Eight or ten would unite together and select a prudent and wise man, and agree to be bound by what he should consent to. These delegates would be *legislators*, and such an assembly would be a *legislature*.

But after the laws were made, when cases of injury became frequent, all the community could not meet together to decide between two men who had a difficulty with each other. They would, therefore, be obliged to appoint some persons who should make it their business to hear causes, and decide according to law. This would save a great deal of time, and would also insure a much better administration of justice. Such men would be *judges*, and when they were assembled they would be called a *court*.

And, besides, after they had decided what was right, and how a bad man should be punished, it would be necessary that some one should carry their sentence into effect. Such persons are called *executive officers*. *Governors*, *sheriffs*, and *constables*, belong to this class.

Now, all these officers taken together, legislators, judges, governors, sheriffs, etc., are

called the government of a country. They are persons appointed by the people, in some mode or other, to make laws and to carry them into execution, so that no man shall interfere with his neighbor's rights; and so that if he does he shall be obliged to make redress, and shall be punished for his crime.

Hence, the duties of man as a citizen are in general these :

1. As he agrees that no one shall interfere with the rights of his neighbor, he is bound to obey this law himself, that is, he is bound, in all his intercourse respecting the personal liberty, character, reputation, property, and families of others, to obey the law of reciprocity, or to do unto others as he would that others should do unto him.

2. If other men disobey this law, and injure him, he is bound not to take redress into his own hands, but to leave it to the society; that is, the courts of law to whom he has agreed that all such cases shall be referred.

3. As he has agreed that all laws shall be made by legislators, he is bound to obey all the laws which they make, consistent with the power which he has entrusted into their hands.

4. As he is a member of the community which has promised to protect every individual, he is bound to use all means necessary to en-

sure that protection. He is bound to make every effort in his power to secure to every individual, whether high or low, rich or poor, the full enjoyment of his rights; and if he be wronged, the full redress for injury.

5. As the purposes of government cannot be carried on without expense, since governors, legislators, judges, etc., must be paid for their services, and as every one has the benefit of these services, every one ought willingly to bear his share of the pecuniary burden.

To illustrate what has been said in the preceding remarks. Suppose a man had stolen your horse, and there were no laws, and no government. You might go to him and ask him for it, and he would refuse to give it up. Suppose you attempted to take the horse away by force, the man might resist you, and, if he were stronger than you, would drive you away and injure you, or perhaps kill you to prevent you from troubling him. You thus could have no remedy, and the next day he might take your cow, or turn you out of your house, and you could not help it.

But suppose there were laws, and a government; observe now how differently you would be situated. In this case there would be a law to prevent men from stealing; and judges to decide whether a man had stolen, and officers

to punish the thief, and to reclaim the property taken.

Let us now suppose the horse to be stolen. Instead of going to the man who stole it, you would go to one of the judges, called justices of the peace, and inform him that the man had stolen your property. He would immediately send for the thief, and bring him before him. If the thief would not come, the sheriff who was sent would have power to order all the men in the town to help him. You would then tell your story and the man would tell his, and if you could prove the horse to be yours the justice would give him up to you, and would send the man to jail to be tried for the crime of stealing. When the judges of the higher court came together, twelve men of the neighborhood would be appointed, who are called jurors, or jurymen. The thief would then be brought before them, and the witnesses would be examined to prove whether the man did steal the horse, or whether he got him in some other way. The judge would explain the law, and the jurors would decide whether the man was guilty or not guilty. If he was not guilty, he would be set at liberty. If he was guilty, the judge would pronounce the punishment of the law for stealing. If it was imprisonment, the sheriff would take him to prison, and he would be kept there until the time expired for which he was sentenced.

We see from this case how much better every one can obtain justice where there are laws and government, than when there are none, and hence how great a blessing it is to live in a civilized country where such laws exist.

QUESTIONS.

1. Could men live together without laws and government?

2. Under what circumstances could they live thus?

3. What creates the necessity for laws and a government?

4. Suppose men all chose to act unjustly, and there were no laws to restrain them, what would be the result?

5. Would laws be of any use without a government? Why?

6. Why would it not answer to allow every man to redress his own grievances?

7. What are the two great laws of society, on which all the others are founded?

8. Explain, in your own language, what is meant by a legislature.

9. How is a legislature appointed?

10. Explain, in your own language, what is meant by a judge.

11. What is the use of judges?

12. What is the use of sheriffs and constables?

13. Suppose a man injures me, and I undertake to punish him myself; do I violate the law of my country? Why?

14. Suppose a man has committed a crime, and I join a mob to tear down his house or to punish him in any manner; do I violate the law? Why?

15. Suppose a law is made, which I think unjust; have I a right to violate it? Why?

16. Suppose I see a mob assaulting a man, and I quietly look on; am I innocent? What ought I to do?

17. Suppose a mob commit an injury, and I praise their courage, and apologize for their crime; am I innocent?

18. Suppose one man, by his abuse, irritates the passions of other men, and they unite and injure him; which is to blame, he or they, or both? Which ought to be punished?

19. Suppose a man should owe you money, and would not pay it; would you have a right to take his property yourself, wherever you could find it? Why?

20. What must you do in order to recover your due?

SECTION II.

OF THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

In the preceding section I have described what is called an *elective* government. By this is meant one in which all officers are either chosen by the people, that is, by the whole society, or are appointed by those who are thus chosen. Thus, in this country, legislators, governors, presidents, etc., are chosen by the people, and judges and other officers are either chosen by the people, or are appointed by the legislators.

But all governments are not elective. Some are hereditary; that is, a man succeeds to

office by inheritance. In this form of government, if a king dies his son becomes a king in his place; that is, he inherits his office in the same manner as he inherits his house or lands. And if a man is a legislator his son becomes, in the same manner, a legislator after him.

Again, some governments are partly hereditary and partly elective. When this is the case some of the offices are hereditary and others are elective; that is, the persons who hold some of them are chosen by the people, and those who hold others succeed to them by inheritance.

But there are other forms of government besides these. A government may be either a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or a Republic.

A Monarchy is a government in which the chief authority is vested in one person, who is called a king. If the king is chosen it is called an *elective* monarchy, if he succeeds to his office by inheritance it is called a *hereditary* monarchy.

In some cases a king is allowed to make laws according to his own will, without any one to control him, and to do what he pleases with the lives and properties of his subjects. This is called an *absolute* monarchy, or a *despotism*. In other cases the king is bound by certain rules which he must not transgress, or is obliged,

before he can make any law, to obtain the consent of some other individuals. This is called a *limited* monarchy.

An Aristocracy is a form of government in which the whole power is in the hands of a *few* persons. An aristocracy has generally been either hereditary, or else the members of the aristocracy themselves fill the vacancies which may occur in their number.

A Republic is such a form of government as I have before described, in which all offices are either held by election of the people, or else by appointment by those who are thus elected.

These forms of government are sometimes simple and sometimes mixed.

Thus, the government of Russia is a simple monarchy, without any limitation of power, the Emperor being assisted by such councils only as he may himself appoint.

2. The government of Great Britain is a mixed monarchy, composed of three branches: the king, the house of lords, and the house of commons.

The office of King is hereditary, and the king is the chief magistrate of the realm.

The Lords or Peers form the second branch of the legislature, and their office is also hereditary. They are at first appointed by the king, but after their appointment they and their

successors hold their office perpetually. The third branch of the legislature is the House of Commons. These are elected by the people as in a republic. No law can be passed, that is, become binding on the people, unless it be agreed to by all these three branches, namely, the King, the Lords, and the Commons.

Under any of these forms of government, if the men who hold offices be virtuous, and desirous of promoting the welfare of their fellow-men, there may be peace, security and happiness. The misfortune, however, to which some of them are liable is, that when officers are vicious, unfeeling and oppressive, there are no means of controlling their power without revolution and civil war. On the contrary, just in so far as a government is elective the power is placed in the hands of the people, who are then in no danger of being oppressed by government. Their only danger then is that they will oppress each other. The danger from this source is however far greater than is commonly apprehended.

QUESTIONS.

1. Explain, in your own language, the difference between an elective and an hereditary government.
2. Explain the difference between a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a republic.
3. Explain the difference between an unlimited and a limited monarchy.

4. What is the difference between the government of Russia and that of England?
5. How may a government oppress the people?
6. How may the people oppress each other?
7. When the people oppress each other, what remedy exists against injury?
8. What is the greatest security against oppression in any government?
9. What effect would the Christian religion exert upon national liberty, if it were universally obeyed?
10. What effect has it had already?
11. Which are the freest governments on earth?

SECTION III.

THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

This country was first peopled by emigrant colonies, principally from England, who landed on various parts of the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Georgia. Each of these colonies had its separate charter, or form of government, which it established as soon as its settlement was formed. As they increased in numbers, their boundaries were defined, and as so many separate governments they held possession of the whole coast. They were all, however, dependent upon the king of England, from whom they received their charters, and by whom most of their governors, and frequently their judges and other officers, were appointed.

As the colonies increased in power, diffi-

culties sprung up between them and Great Britain, or the mother country, as it was commonly called. These ended in the American revolution, by which the colonies were forever separated from Great Britain, and were acknowledged by the whole world to be at liberty to form a government for themselves, on such principles, and in such manner, as they chose.

Soon after the revolution, delegates were appointed by these several colonies, or States, as they were then called, to form a constitution, or, in other words, to establish a form of government. This was completed on the 17th of September, 1787, and was submitted to the several States for approval. This having been subsequently approved by all the States, is the form of government under which we now live.

The general features of this form of government are the following :

The separate States retain all the original powers which they possessed when they separated from the British nation, except such as they have given up to the general government. Thus, they all elect their own officers, make their own laws, and punish offenders against them, and are sovereign in everything that does not interfere with the general good of the whole.

On the other hand, whatever belongs to the

welfare of the whole, and not to that of the individual States, is vested in the general government, or in Congress, which is its agent. The extent, however, within which this power may be exercised is limited by the constitution.

The head of the government in this country is called the President ; he holds his office for four years, and is chosen by electors, who are elected either by the people or by the legislatures of the several States.

The legislature of the United States is divided into two branches, the Senate and House of Representatives.

The Senate is composed of two members from each State. The members hold their office for six years, and are chosen by the legislatures of the several States.

The members of the House of Representatives are elected by the people of the several States, every State being entitled to one for every 70,680 inhabitants. They hold their office for two years. No law can be enacted unless it receive the sanction of the President, and of both houses of Congress, except both Houses pass it by a majority of two thirds, in opposition to the President ; it then becomes a law without his consent.

The President and Senate have power to form

treaties with foreign powers, and to appoint all the principal officers of the government, as judges of the United States Courts, ambassadors, officers in the army and navy, etc.

The judges of the United States Court have power to try all causes of violation of the laws of the United States, and all causes between citizens of the different States, and all causes which arise between a citizen of the United States and a foreigner. All offences against the laws of the several States are tried by the judges of the respective States. Each State has its own form of government, consisting of a Governor and either one or two legislative assemblies. These enact laws for their own State, appoint officers, and in general perform all the offices necessary for the welfare of that portion of the people which they represent.

QUESTIONS.

1. How was this country first peopled by Europeans?
2. How were they governed before the Revolution?
3. What produced the Revolution?
4. In what condition were they when the Revolution was completed?
5. What is the difference between the power of the States, and that of the United States, or general government?
6. How long do the President, Senators, and members of the House of Representatives, hold their offices?

7. What powers have the Senate, different from those of the House of Representatives?

8. Suppose a citizen of the United States to owe a foreigner; to what court must the foreigner apply for redress?

9. Suppose a cause in law to arise between two citizens of different States; where must the cause be tried? Give an example.

DUTIES OF BENEVOLENCE.

CHAPTER I.

BENEVOLENCE.

WE have thus far treated of those duties which we owe to man, on the principle of reciprocity, and for which he can have a just claim upon us. They are those duties which, while they allow us to pursue our own happiness as we please, forbid us in any manner to interfere with the right which every one possesses, to pursue his own happiness in the same manner.

If men would only obey this law the world would be much happier than it is. There would be no oppression, no robbery, no slander, no injury of any kind, but all men would live in peace and quietness.

But in order to render the world as happy as it can be, something more is necessary. We are required not only to let our neighbors alone and do them no injury, but also positively to do them good. This is the law of *benevolence*.

For instance. Every one is liable to be sick, and multitudes of people are always sick.

When sick they are unable to work for a livelihood, or even to take care of themselves.

If then there were no one to take care of them, they would perish. Everybody is liable to accidents, and if no one would help a man in distress, he must suffer. How wicked it would be if a little girl were run over by a carriage, and I were to leave her to be trodden to death, because I did not owe her anything, and wished to mind my own business. Every one feels that though I had never seen her before, and were never to see her again, yet I would be under obligations to render her all the aid in my power; that is, every one feels that I am, and that every man is, under the obligation of benevolence.

But again. Suppose that in a neighborhood there were a large number of children who did not know how to read or to write, and so were deprived of all the pleasure of reading good books, and especially of reading the Bible. Now suppose that there were in this neighborhood two young men, and one of them said he did not owe these children anything, and should mind his own business. But suppose the other, without asking whether they owed him or not, should collect them together in school, and teach them to read, and write, and cipher, and thus put them all in the way to be useful and

happy men and women. Which of these should we love the best? Which should we say did his duty? Which of them should we say was acting in such a manner as best to please his Father in heaven?

Again, suppose these children were very wicked, and swore, and lied, and stole. If any good person saw and heard them act thus, he would be greatly grieved. I do not know but it would be his duty to have the worst and largest of them punished. Now suppose one man should say, it is my duty as a citizen to put a stop to such conduct, and I will have these little thieves put in jail. But this is all I have to do; I will mind my own business, and if they go to destruction it is their own fault. But suppose another man should go among them, and show them the wickedness of their conduct, and talk kindly to them, and teach them to be good and virtuous, and so be the means of making them all pious and virtuous children. Which of these two should we like the best? Which should we say did his duty to these children? Which would act most in obedience to the Bible?

But once more. Suppose these children should revile and abuse him, steal his property, and when he came to do them good should ridicule him, and do all in their power to injure

him. He might go away and leave them, saying, I have come here at my own expense, and without any reward, to teach these children to be virtuous and happy, and all I get in return is injury, abuse, and robbery. I will go away and leave them to destruction. Or he might say, I do not care how they treat me, I will still continue to do them all the good I can. The more wickedly they act towards me, the more clearly it shows that they need good instruction, and I will strive the more to make them virtuous and happy. The more they hate me, the more I will love them. Now, which of these ways of acting would be the most lovely? For which should we think most highly of the man? Which conduct would be most like doing our duty? Which would be most like the example of the blessed Saviour?

If now we reflect upon these cases, we shall see that we feel under obligations to benevolence towards men who are unhappy, towards those that are wicked, and even towards those that injure us.

That this is the case, is manifest from what the blessed Saviour teaches us in Luke vi. 32—36.

“If ye love them that love you, what thank have ye, for sinners also love those that love them? And if ye do good to those that do good to you, what thank have ye, for sinners

also do even the same. And if ye lend to those of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to *receive as much again*. But love ye your enemies, and do good and lend, hoping for nothing again, and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest, for he is kind unto the unthankful and the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father in heaven is merciful."

Thus also Matthew v. 43—48. "Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you, and pray for those that despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children (that is, the imitators) of your Father who is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and the good, and sendeth his rain upon the just and upon the unjust."

The meaning of "being merciful," here is obvious. It is to promote the happiness of those who have no claim upon us, by the law of reciprocity, and from whom we can hope for nothing by way of remuneration.

The *example after which our benevolence is to be fashioned* is that of our Father who is in heaven.

This teaches us,

1. As God is the exhaustless source of happiness to all the creatures whom he has made and to whom he is under no possible obliga-

tions, so we are commanded to make use of our talents and acquisitions and possessions for promoting the happiness of our fellows. Whatever is given us is given, not for our own happiness directly and chiefly, but for our happiness indirectly; that is, that we may be happy by promoting the happiness of others.

2. God bestows the blessing of his common providence without respect to the character of the recipient. He sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. We are to follow the same example. While our personal attachments and our moral esteem are to be reserved for those that deserve it, yet our charities are to be bestowed wherever there exist those that stand in need of them. We are therefore to relieve the distressed, to pity the afflicted, to assist the needy, administer to the sick, and instruct the ignorant, no matter how undeserving they may be, or how much we may dislike their moral character.

3. By the same example we are taught that our benevolence is not to be limited by the feelings which the recipient may have towards us. God so loved us that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. When we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son. Thus our blessed Saviour spent his life in doing good to his bitterest enemies, unmoved

by the most atrocious and most malignant injustice. So we are commanded to bless those that curse us, do good to those that hate us, and pray for those that despitefully use us and persecute us.

The reasons, aside from the example of God, which enforce this duty upon us, are various. Some of them are the following :

1. God has made it the condition of the pardon of our offences against him. “ If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly Father forgive your trespasses.” Read the parable of the two servants, Matt. xviii. 23—35.

2. Those virtues which are called into exercise by ill treatment from our fellow-men are those which exhibit the highest moral excellence, and are most essential to that character which fits us for heaven. Such are meekness, patience, forgiveness. It is to such tempers of mind that a special blessing is promised.

The virtues which *man* rewards may proceed from the love and the fear of man. It is those for the exercise of which we can expect no reward from *men*, that are the proper evidence of our love and obedience to God. Thus it is that these virtues are held forth to us as the evidences of true piety. See our Lord’s description of the last judgment, in Matthew xxv.

“Inasmuch as ye have done it (that is mercy) unto the very least of these, ye have done it unto me.”

I might add that the law of benevolence applies to man as man, that is, to man irrespective of any of the temporary relations in which he may stand to us. It makes no matter whether he be of our kindred or of another, a fellow-citizen or an alien, a Christian or an infidel, it is enough that he is a man, and this entitles him, under the law of God, to all the benefits of the law of benevolence. Nay, in one sense, the fewer the ties that bind him to us, the more glorious is the act of goodness, because it is under these circumstances that we can cherish the least hope of reward, and the more evident will be the proof of our disinterestedness. It would have been noble in Howard to have visited the prisons of England alone, but it was more noble to extend his inquiries to those of France, the national enemy of England. It would have been glorious to have died a martyr to the cause of benevolence at home, but how much more so was it to die in a remote province of the Russian empire, in a town of which the existence would scarcely be remembered but for the fact that it witnessed his last deeds of mercy, and guards his sacred

remains until the morning of the resurrection.

If this command is given to man, I see not why it is not equally obligatory on nations. They seem to me to be under the same obligations to conduct towards each other on the principles of benevolence as individuals; that is, to make it a fundamental principle of their policy to do each other good by all the means which God has placed in their power.

We shall, in the succeeding chapter, treat of benevolence to the unhappy, to the wicked, and to the injurious.

QUESTIONS.

1. Do we perform our whole duty, if we simply abstain from injuring others? Illustrate this by an example of your own.

2. If we merely abstain from injury, what class of duties do we perform, and what class do we omit?

3. How do you feel towards those that will do nothing for others more than merely abstain from injury?

4. How do you feel towards those who endeavor to do all the good they can to others, whether they be friends or enemies?

5. What should these feelings teach you?

6. What are the precepts of the blessed Saviour on this subject?

7. What was the example of the blessed Saviour?

8. What do we learn from the example of God towards us?

9. Suppose God were to bestow no favors upon *us*,

but those that *we have deserved*, what would be our condition?

10. What favors does he bestow upon us, that we have really deserved?

11. In what manner has God connected the forgiveness of our own offences with our forgiveness of those of others?

12. Which class of virtues are most acceptable to God; those of reciprocity, or those of benevolence?

13. How many reasons can you give for this?

14. How extensive are our obligations to benevolence?

15. In what respect does the law of benevolence apply to nations?

16. Were nations to act upon this principle towards each other, what effect would it produce upon war?



CHAPTER II.

SECTION I.

BENEVOLENCE TO THE NECESSITOUS.

A MAN may be necessitous from poverty, from sickness, or decrepitude, or from ignorance.

Simple poverty in general, so long as a man has the ability to labor, does not render him an object of charity. If a man does not possess the means of subsistence he should work for them. What we are generally required to do in such a case is to furnish men with work,

and thus enable them to support themselves. It is no kindness either to the individual or to society, to support him in idleness. Such is the nature of the benevolence of God. While he bestows the means of support upon all, giving us food and harvests, he still gives them only as the result of labor. The apostle Paul also taught that if a man would not work, neither should he eat.

To this, however, there are exceptions. Thus, a family may, by the providence of God, be deprived of *their means of labor*. Such cases arise from shipwreck, from fire, from flood, or sometimes from the want of employment, in manufacturing districts. In general, when the providence of God, and not a man's idleness, renders him necessitous, he is, by this act of God, pointed out to us as an object of benevolence. Another exception is, where the labor of parents is insufficient for the support of their children. Such is the case, very frequently, where widows are left with several small children, and still more impressively, when children have lost both of their parents. In both cases some or all must perish if the aid of benevolence do not interpose.

2. *Sickness*. Here the providence of God takes away a man's ability to labor, and he needs, more than ever, the comforts which labor

provides. Without assistance, the rich would then suffer; how much more must this be the case with the poor. When such claims as these are made upon our charity, not only our pecuniary bounty, but our personal assistance should be freely rendered.

3. *Old Age.* Though old age is not always accompanied with sickness, it generally is by decrepitude, and frequently with loneliness. Whatever it is in our power to do to mitigate the pains and alleviate the burdens of age is manifestly a duty of benevolence, and, in some sort, of filial affection.

Such are the instances under this head which demand our benévolence. The rules to be observed are easily to be seen.

1. The poor, who, either by sickness or old age, are unable to labor at all, should be *wholly* supported.

2. The poor, who, by sickness, old age, or orphanage, are able only in part to support themselves, should be *assisted*.

3. Those who are unable immediately to obtain work should be relieved for the *present*, and work should be procured for them. The greatest kindness to any man is to enable him to help himself.

4. It is a very great act of kindness to provide means by which the poor may be enabled

to preserve and accumulate their small earnings, such as savings banks, and institutions of this sort. These are the true means of rendering the industrious independent, and they have laid the foundations of the fortunes of thousands.

So far as the *benefactor* is concerned, it is to be remarked :

1. That the duty of benevolence is imposed upon all. Every one may not be able to bestow money upon others, but every man may render assistance in some form to the distressed, and every man may show sympathy with the afflicted. Children may be benevolent as well as men and women. If they would devote a part of the money which they spend in toys, to purchase food for the sick, or if they were to share their comforts and delicacies with their poorer neighbors, it would be a most excellent mode of improving themselves in virtue.

2. Those modes of benevolence which bring us into immediate contact with the sufferers, are always to be preferred. It is much better to bestow charity ourselves than to give it to others to bestow, though to give it to others to bestow is better than not to give it at all. Nothing has a better effect upon our hearts, nothing tends more to awaken gratitude to God, than personal sympathy with the distresses of our fellows.

3. And, lastly, inasmuch as charity should be a religious service, like prayer, it should be as much as possible in private. Our alms should be in secret, and our Father who seeth in secret will himself reward us openly.

OF EDUCATION.

Every one must see how great a misfortune it is to be unable to read and write and cipher. A person who is thus ignorant has scarcely any means of acquiring knowledge, and can neither read the Word of God, nor even read a letter sent to him by a friend. It must then be very pleasing to God, for those who understand these branches of knowledge to teach those who are ignorant.

A very excellent opportunity of this kind is afforded in the Sabbath schools which exist in almost every town in our country. Every young person who desires to cultivate benevolence, and to obey God, ought to engage in this excellent charity. The good that we may do in thus rescuing a child from ignorance and vice is incalculable.

And besides this these schools afford us an opportunity of instructing the young, not only in human learning, but also in the Bible, which contains the only knowledge that can save their souls. What can be more pleasing to God than

to behold young persons showing their gratitude for the favors which they have received, by immediately conferring the same favors upon others?

QUESTIONS.

1. Suppose a strong and healthy man asks me for money, am I under obligation, simply because he is without money, to give him any? Why?

2. What ought I to do for him?

3. Is it better to give him work or money? Why?

4. What example have I to justify this?

5. Suppose, however, I found that this man's house had been burned down last night, and all of his family's clothing and food consumed; what ought I then to do?

6. Suppose, by some act of God, all the manufactories in my neighborhood were stopped, and the laborers could get no work; what ought I to do?

7. Suppose a widow has been left with several small children, and it required a dollar a day to support them, while she could, with all her labor, earn but a half a dollar a day. Is she an object of charity, and to what amount?

8. What is our duty to the sick and the afflicted?

9. What does Christ teach us on this subject? Where does he speak on this subject?

10. Does his precept enjoin anything besides the giving of money?

11. Are the poor under obligation to be benevolent?

12. How can they be benevolent without money?

13. Why is it better to relieve a sufferer ourselves, than to give money to another to relieve them?

14. Why should charity be in secret?

15. Is there any charity in *teaching* others?

16. Have young persons any particular means of charity which devolve specially upon them?

SECTION II.

BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED.

So far as we have gone, we have considered solely our duty to those who are unhappy. We now come to consider our duty to another class, those that are wicked.

We have seen that if a man is unhappy from sickness, or age, or poverty, it is our duty to relieve him. But a wicked man is unhappy in the very worst sense, for there is no misery so great as sin. And, still more, he is always the cause of wickedness in others. He is like a man sick with some infectious disease, which he is in danger of communicating to all that are around him. And still more, the pains of this life terminate at death, but the pains of sin at death are infinitely increased, and are, after that, incapable of cure forever.

Now all these considerations teach us that a wicked man is, above all others, an object of pity. And hence it is our special duty to try to benefit him by rendering him virtuous.

Many people say that if a man be wicked we should shun him and let him alone. This is true in one sense. We should not make him our companion, we should not put ourselves in

danger of learning his wicked habits. If a man is a drunkard, we should not go and drink with him; if a man is profane, we should not associate with him. All this is so; but this is no reason why we should not try to reclaim the drunkard, and teach the profane person to fear an oath. It is one thing to adopt men as our friends and associates, and another thing to try to do them good.

The duties which we owe to men who are wicked are the following:

1. We should consider them when in affliction or distress to be as truly objects of our pity as other men. That we should *feel as much pleasure* in relieving them as in relieving the virtuous is perhaps impossible. But this does not show that it is *not as much our duty to do so*.

2. We should, by all means in our power, labor to reclaim them from vice.

This may be done:

1. By example. By acting virtuously ourselves we administer the kindest, and frequently the most effectual reproof to the vicious. If we are in their company, therefore, we should always resolutely show that we are on the side of virtue, and have no sympathy with vice. Though they may ridicule us, and dislike us, yet love to them should teach us to bear this patiently for their good.

2. By precept. We should, by suitable conversation, endeavor to convince men of the evil of their course, and urge and encourage them to return to virtue. Advice of this sort is generally vastly more effective if given in private.

3. As the truths of religion are by far the most efficient agents in restoring men to virtue, we should use all proper means to circulate them among men, not only by conversation, but also by the distribution of religious books and specially of the Scriptures.

4. As all men are our brethren, and all men need moral assistance, it is, manifestly, our imperative duty to reclaim the wicked as widely as possible. As by far the greater part of men are utterly ignorant of the way of salvation, hence it is our important duty to send the gospel everywhere to the destitute.

5. Such is the darkness of the mind of men, and they are so obstinately bent on doing wrong, that we can hope for little success in this mode of benevolence without the assistance of a higher power. God has promised to grant this assistance in answer to prayer. Hence, it is also our particular duty to pray for the influences of the Spirit of God to attend our labors and the labors of all who are engaged in the work of benefiting mankind.

QUESTIONS.

1. Why is a wicked man an object of benevolence?
2. Why is he, *specially*, an object of benevolence?
3. If it is our duty to *shun* the wicked, how can it be our duty to *seek after them*, and try to reclaim them?
4. Suppose a wicked man is sick, or has broken his leg; does his wickedness excuse me from the duties of benevolence?
5. If men are wicked, should we follow their *bad* example?
6. What reason does their wickedness offer, why we should set them a *good* example?
7. Is there any benevolence in persuading men to be virtuous? How can you show this to be benevolent?
8. What are the most efficacious means of rendering men better?
9. Do all men need this kind of benevolence?
10. How wide is the limit of this means of doing good?
11. Have we any reason to hope that God will, in a special manner, assist our efforts to make men better, if we ask him to do it?
12. What duty devolves upon us in consequence of his assurance to this effect?

SECTION III.

BENEVOLENCE TO THE INJURIOUS.

We now proceed to another case. Suppose a person to be injurious; that is, suppose that, besides being wicked, he has been wicked to us, that is, has injured *us*. What is our duty to him in such a case?

1. Inasmuch as the *action* is wicked, it should excite our moral disapprobation as truly as if it were done to any one else. We should, under all circumstances, dislike vice and love virtue.

2. But if we consider the person *himself*, inasmuch as he is wicked, he is unhappy, and hence we are bound to pity and to relieve, that is, if possible to reform him.

3. As the injury is done to *us*, it is *our* duty to *forgive him*. This is the duty specially required of us by our blessed Saviour. If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly Father forgive your trespasses. On our obedience to this command, therefore, is suspended our only hope of salvation.

4. As the injury is done to us, it presents us with a special opportunity of doing good to the injurious person *by setting before him an example of goodness*. Hence, it is our duty to overcome his evil by good; that is, by treating him with special kindness, and manifesting a special regard for his happiness. Thus says our blessed Saviour, *Bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you*.

How much better is this way of settling difficulties, than that of retaliation. In this mode

both parties are made better ; by retaliation, both are made worse. By the one, injuries would be multiplied without end ; by the other, they cease immediately by the mere exercise of goodness.

While this, however, is the case, it does not prevent us from taking the proper means for punishing men who not only offend against *us*, but also offend against *society*. If a man break into my house, it does not follow, from what has been said, that I should not take proper means to have him put in prison. Otherwise he might go on robbing to the end of his life, which would be the greatest misfortune both to him and to others. While I may forgive him for the injuries done to me, and use all means to reclaim him, my duty to others as well as to him obliges me to take such means as may prevent his going on in his course of wickedness.

But, on the other hand, society should look upon him as a being whom it is their duty to improve. Hence prisoners should be always treated humanely, and be comfortably clothed and fed, and every means should be used to render them virtuous. Prisons would thus be schools of moral reformation, and would be the greatest possible blessing both to the wicked themselves, and to the rest of the community.

Houses of refuge for juvenile delinquents have been a most valuable blessing to the community, and have saved hundreds of youth from destruction. All prisons should be of the same character, and would then, I believe, be attended with the same result.

QUESTIONS.

1. What do you mean by an injurious man?
2. What feelings should we have to a bad *action*, by which we have been injured?
3. What feelings should we have towards the *person* himself, who has injured us?
4. What special duty devolves upon *us*, in distinction from others, from the fact that *we* have been injured?
5. What good can we derive from an injury?
6. Are there any virtues called into exercise by injury more than by any other cause?
7. What do you mean by retaliation? Give an example.
8. Give an example of retaliation, and of overcoming evil with good.
9. Which produces the best effect upon the injurious person?
10. Which is the best way of repaying injury?
11. Does this prevent us from punishing men who violate the law of society?
12. Is it, or is it not, for the good of an offender himself, to be punished?
13. With what end should prisons be constructed and governed?

CHAPTER III.

OF OUR DUTIES TO BRUTES.

BRUTES, like ourselves, are sensitive beings, that is, they are capable of pleasure or pain, probably to as great a degree as we are. They differ from us principally in being destitute of the moral faculty. They do not know right from wrong.

They are not, however, on a level with us. Hence they cannot claim the right of reciprocity. We are at liberty to diminish their means of happiness, or to take their lives for our own happiness, if our necessities, and frequently if our innocent conveniences demand it. God has given them to us for food, and hence has placed their lives in our power. But we have no right to use this power for any other purposes or in any other manner than as he has permitted. Thus,

1. We may take their lives for food, if we need it. A man may slay a bullock if he needs it to eat, but he has no right to kill one for sport. A man on a prairie may shoot a deer or a buffalo, if he wants the flesh for food, or the skin for clothing, but he has no right to do it for the purpose of improving his skill in marksmanship. So, if we wish a bird for food,

it is right to shoot it, but it is not right to shoot it wantonly or for amusement. Why should we, for a momentary pleasure, deprive the poor brute of all the blessings of existence?

2. We may use them for labor, as we use horses for the draft or for the saddle.

3. But while we thus use them, we are bound to use them kindly, and subject them to no unnecessary fatigue, and to no unnecessary pain. If our necessity require a horse to be overdriven, as for instance to preserve life, or to accomplish important business, we are at liberty to overdrive it. But we have no right to do this for our own pleasure, or for the sake of gambling on the speed of animals.

4. Hence all amusements which consist in inflicting pain upon animals, such as horse-racing, bull-baiting, cock-fighting, are purely wicked. God never gave us power over animals for such purposes. I can conceive of no spectacle more revolting than that of an assembly of intelligent beings, collected to witness the misery which two brutes inflict upon each other. Surely nothing can tend more directly to harden men into worse than brutal ferocity.

QUESTIONS.

1. What is the difference between a brute and a man?
2. In what respect are brutes and men similar to each other?
3. What right have we over them? Give an example in your own language.
4. Would it be right to shoot a robin, to see how correctly you could take aim?
5. Under what circumstances would it be innocent to shoot a bird?
6. Suppose a physician were called to see a patient who must die, if not relieved immediately; would it be innocent for him to drive his horse to death, in order to save the patient?
7. Would it be right to drive him thus, on a wager?
8. But the horse in both cases is his own property; what makes the difference?
9. Is it right for young persons to set brute animals to fighting? Why?

END.

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